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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Constrained optimal 
allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be 
implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The 
market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986): agents supply labor and trade 
risk-free claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are 
conditioned only on two observable characteristics- an agent’s accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, 
and her current labour income- and they are not additively separable in these variables. The marginal 
wealth tax is decreasing in labour income and its expected value is generally positive. The marginal la-
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This paper studies optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information. Speciﬁcally,
we consider an environment in which agents’ preferences are deﬁned over consumption and labour, and
each agent receives a privately observed sequence of i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks. Incentive-compatibility
constraints stemming from private information imply that socially optimal, or “constrained eﬃcient”,
allocations in this environment are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be
implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The
market structure in these economies is identical to that in Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994):
agents can trade current consumption for claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and
a borrowing limit. These claims have a non-contingent pre-tax return. Crucially, taxes are conditioned
upon only two observable characteristics of an agent: current wealth, given by the agent’s accumulated
stock of claims, and current labour income. They do not depend on any other aspect of an agent’s past
history. The model has implications for the optimal taxation of both wealth and labour earnings. It implies
optimal taxes that are non-linear and non-separable in these variables. In particular, the marginal tax on
wealth is negatively correlated with an agent’s labour income, while the marginal labour income tax is
decreasing in wealth.
Most models of dynamic optimal taxation follow the Ramsey approach, in which the set of ﬁscal
instruments available to the government is exogenously speciﬁed 1. Linear labour and capital income taxes
are typically included in this set, while lump-sum taxes are ruled out. The exclusion of the latter is justiﬁed
by appealing to incentive or administrative constraints, but these are not explicitly modelled. These
exogenous restrictions on ﬁscal instruments become themselves a source of frictions. The government’s
optimal taxation problem reduces to one of selecting from amongst a limited number of policy instruments
so as to ameliorate these frictions.
The approach we adopt in this paper builds on the optimal non-linear income taxation literature initi-
ated by Mirrlees (1971). This literature emphasises that incentive-compatibility constraints due to private
information give rise to endogenous restrictions on optimal tax policies. It then characterises those tax
functions that induce agents to select the constrained eﬃcient allocation. The resulting optimal non-linear
income taxes reproduce the patterns of wedges - gaps between individual marginal rates of substitution
and transformation - induced by the incentive-compatibility constraints at the optimal allocation. This
1Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide an excellent overview of this literature.
2research has concentrated on static models, leaving the properties of optimal taxes in dynamic economies
with private information largely unexplored2.
We also build on the dynamic contracting literature.3 This literature studies the properties of constrained-
eﬃcient allocations in dynamic economies with private information. However, it limits the analysis to
implementation via direct mechanisms. While such mechanisms can be interpreted as tax systems, they
seem divorced from the actual combination of markets and taxes that are used in practice to allocate re-
sources, at least within modern, industrialised economies.4 In contrast, we consider ﬁscal implementations
in which agents choose labour supplies and trade claims to future consumption in each period and taxes
are conditioned on the agents’ observable trades.
Although we analyse ﬁscal implementations, we do rely on a key insight from the dynamic contracting
literature in constructing them. As Green (1987) and others have shown, direct mechanisms are naturally
recursive in promised utilities. Similarly, in our ﬁscal implementations, equilibrium allocations are recursive
in an agent’s wealth. In the same way that promised utility encodes an agent’s history under the direct
mechanism, wealth encodes an agent’s history in a ﬁscal implementation. The government is able to
infer from an agent’s wealth the continuation allocation to which she is entitled. Since the tax system is
designed to induce the agent to choose this allocation, it is essential that taxes depend on wealth. Thus,
the informational role of wealth is central in determining how it is taxed.
Despite this parallel between direct mechanisms and ﬁscal implementations, the existence of the former
does not imply the existence of the latter. Under a direct mechanism, an agent reports her privately
observed shocks to a planner and receives allocations of consumption and labour. By adopting diﬀerent
reporting strategies she can obtain diﬀerent allocations. In the market economy, an agent chooses budget-
feasible consumption and labour supply allocations. Since the constrained eﬃcient allocation is incentive-
compatible, it can be implemented if the set of budget-feasible allocations in the market economy equals
the set of allocations available to an agent under the direct mechanism. However, with a simple tax system
restricted to condition on current wealth and labour earnings only, the ﬁrst set is strictly larger than the
second. Speciﬁcally, an agent in the market economy might choose a labour supply that is consistent with
2Brito et al. (1991), da Costa and Werning (2001) and Kocherlakota (2003) apply the Mirrlees approach in a dynamic
setting. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003) apply a similar strategy to the analysis of disability insurance.
3A selected reference list includes: Green (1987), Phelan & Townsend (1991), Atkeson & Lucas (1992, 1995), and Phelan
(1994).
4They may more closely resemble the arrangements used in simple village economies, see Townsend (1995) or Ligon (1998).
3constrained eﬃcient behaviour given a particular history of shocks, but then allocate her after-tax resources
between consumption and savings in a way that matches constrained eﬃcient behaviour given a diﬀerent
history of shocks. The tax system cannot verify consistency of the previous period’s labour earnings with
this period’s wealth, nor can it ensure that an agent’s savings are consistent with her labour earnings.
Surprisingly, when agents’ preferences are separable in consumption and labour and when idiosyncratic
shocks are i.i.d., we show that it is possible to design a tax system, conditioned on current wealth and
labor earnings only, that induces agents to choose the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
The binding incentive-compatibility constraints imply that constrained-eﬃcient allocations satisfy a
pattern of wedges between marginal rates of transformation and individual marginal rates of substitution.
The optimal tax function is shaped by this pattern. In particular, marginal tax rates must be such that
the agent’s ﬁrst order conditions hold at the constrained eﬃcient allocation. However, simply matching
marginal taxes to these wedges does not guarantee that the constrained eﬃcient allocation will be im-
plemented. Inducing agents to choose this allocation in the market economy places more structure on
marginal tax rates.
Constrained eﬃcient allocations in a dynamic setting are characterised by an intertemporal wedge.A
marginal increase in savings at date t exacerbates the incentive problem at t +1since it reduces the
correlation between consumption and labor supply in that period. It follows that the cost of a marginal
increase in savings is greater than the marginal utility of forgone current consumption, giving rise to
a gap between the planner’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, qt, and the agent’s expected
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution at the constrained-eﬃcient allocation5:






It is natural to suppose that a positive marginal asset tax is needed to implement this wedge, thus giving
rise to a rationale for the taxation of assets that is often absent from complete information Ramsey models.
However, we show the presence of an intertemporal wedge does not necessarily translate into a positive
expected marginal asset tax.











5This result was initially derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985). Golosov, Kocherlakota and
Tsyvinski (2003) provide an extremely general derivation.
4Here, qt represents the price at time t of a claim to period t+1consumption,6 Tt+1 (bt+1,y t+1) denotes taxes
in period t +1as a function of an agent’s wealth bt+1 and labour income yt+1,a n d
∂Tt+1
∂b is the marginal
asset tax. An agent’s labour income yt+1 will vary with the idiosyncratic shock at date t +1 . Hence, by
allowing
∂Tt+1
∂b to depend on yt+1 we admit the possibility of a marginal asset tax that is stochastic from
























This decomposition illustrates two ways in which the marginal taxation of wealth can generate an in-
tertemporal wedge. The most direct way is to reduce the expected return on savings by having a positive





> 0. The second way is to set marginal asset taxes such that the







> 0.T h i s
discourages savings in period t by making claims a less eﬀective hedge against period t +1consumption
risk. Crucially, (2) shows that there is no presumption that the intertemporal wedge translates into positive
expected marginal asset taxes.
We illustrate with an example that a negative covariance between the marginal asset tax and labor
income is required to implement the constrained-eﬃcient allocation, in order to rule out "joint deviations"
in which agents save too much in period t and work too little in period t +1 . It follows that the tax
function must be non-separable in wealth and current labor income. We then describe how our optimal tax
system guarantees that such deviations are sub-optimal for the agent. In addition, we provide an example
in which, despite a positive intertemporal wedge, the expected marginal asset tax is zero. We show that,
more generally, if the allocation to be implemented at t +1prescribes that labor supply should be lower
for agents with higher wealth, the expected marginal asset tax will be positive.
Constrained-eﬃcient allocations in our model also satisfy a lower bound on continuation utilities, as in
Atkeson and Lucas (1995). We implement this constraint with a borrowing limit in the market economy.
The lower bound on continuation utility implies that, in a neighbourhood of this bound, the constrained-
eﬃcient allocation for our dynamic setting will resemble one arising from a static model since there must
be a smaller reliance on continuation utility to provide incentives. This will translate into greater curvature
of the optimal tax function in a neighbourhood of the borrowing limit in the market economy.
6This price equals the planner’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the direct mechanism.
5We explore the steady state properties of the optimal tax system in numerical examples. Our benchmark
parameterisation is consistent with recent calibrations of Bewley economies with endogenous labour supply.
We ﬁnd that the optimal tax system displays a strong dependence of marginal asset and marginal income
taxes on wealth, as well as a high curvature of optimal tax function in the neighbourhood of the borrowing
limit. The optimal marginal labour income tax is high at low wealth and decreasing in wealth. Recent
contributions to the static optimal non-linear income taxation literature, such as Diamond (1998) and
Saez (2001), ﬁnd that optimal marginal income taxes are high at low income levels and decreasing in
income. This result is interpreted as being consistent with the rapid phasing out of social beneﬁts at low
incomes, but is sensitive to assumptions on preferences and the shock distribution. In contrast, the negative
dependence of marginal income taxes on wealth in our model is robust to alternative parameterisations.
This feature is particularly marked in the neighbourhood of the borrowing limit, where there is a need to
provide insurance to agents who are restricted in their ability to smooth consumption intertemporally via
asset markets. On the other hand, we also ﬁnd the dependence of marginal labor income taxes on labour
to be sensitive to parameters.
For all our computed examples, the intertemporal wedge is small away from the borrowing limit. It is
less than 1% over most of the wealth range, but close to this limit it rises steeply to a peak of 16% in our
benchmark parameterisation. The marginal asset tax is very close to zero for wealth levels away from the
borrowing limit. The expected marginal asset tax is small, it equals approximately 2% at the borrowing
limit and falls steadily with wealth. The covariance between the marginal asset tax and the marginal
utility of consumption also falls with wealth, but it is much larger close to the limit and declines steeply as
wealth increases. This covariance plays the major role in generating the intertemporal wedge only when
this wedge is large. The small computed value of the intertemporal wedge does not imply that taxation of
asset income is small in our economy. The equilibrium net rate of return on assets is approximately 10%
in our computed examples, implying that the corresponding marginal tax on asset income is equal to our
marginal asset tax augmented by a factor of 10.
Our paper is closely related to Kocherlakota (2003). He also derives a tax system that implements
constrained-optimal allocations in an environment similar to ours. His analysis allows for persistent idio-
syncratic shocks. Kocherlakota’s tax system is not recursive and does not exploit the information conveyed
by an agent’s asset position. Instead, it conditions taxes on agents’ entire history of labour earnings. Thus,
his tax system, while more general, is also much more complex than ours. Interestingly, Kocherlakota’s
6optimal tax system always implies a zero expected marginal asset tax. As we discuss in the body of the
paper, results on marginal asset taxes are sensitive to the way in which the tax system uses information
on the agents’ past history.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we state the planner’s problem for
economies of arbitrary ﬁnite length. We provide a recursive formulation for the planner’s problem that is
closely related to those in Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995). In section 3, we prove our main implementation
result for an economy with two periods and then extend the proof to economies of arbitrary ﬁnite length.
Section 4 studies the optimal pattern of wedges that characterise constrained-eﬃcient allocations. In this
section we begin to discuss the relationship between wedges and taxes in a dynamic setting. Section 5
provides a series of examples that analyze this relationship in a two-period setting. In section 6, we extend
our implementation results to economies of inﬁnite length. We present a numerical analysis of the optimal
tax system in the steady state of an inﬁnite period economy in section 7. In this section, we also compare
our optimal tax system with the ﬁndings of the static optimal non-linear income taxation literature. Section
8 concludes.
2 The planner’s problem in a ﬁnite period economy
In this section, we formally describe the planner’s problem in a ﬁnite period economy. The economy is
inhabited by a continuum of agents. These agents have preferences over stochastic sequences {ct,y t}T
t=0 of








We assume that u : R+ → U ⊂ R and v : Y → V ⊂ R are continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave
and, respectively, strictly increasing and strictly decreasing functions. The variable θt ∈ Θ ⊂ R denotes
an idiosyncratic preference shock. We assume that Θ is a compact set and that the preference shocks
are distributed independently over time and across agents with probability distribution π.7 We deﬁne a
t-period history to be θt =( θ0,...,θt) ∈ Θt+1 and denote the corresponding probability distribution by
7The distribution function π also describes the cross sectional distribution of θt at each t, which amounts to assuming that
the law of large numbers holds across agents. As is well known, the law of large numbers may not apply if the underlying
index space is a Borel measure. We implicitly rely on the construction of Judd (1985) to resolve this issue.
7πt. We assume that the idiosyncratic shocks are privately observed by agents. The term θtv(yt) denotes
the disutility from labour at time t. Preference shocks alter the disutility of labour and the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labour. They may, for example, be interpreted as short-lived
shocks to health. We will focus on this interpretation and also assume that the production technology
converts one unit of labour into one unit of output. The preference shock formulation that we adopt can
easily be mapped into one in which agents receive privately observed productivity shocks that perturb
their individual marginal rates of transformation of labour into output.
Each agent is identiﬁed with a number w0 which represents the agent’s initial entitlement to expected
lifetime utility, or initial utility promise. Let Ψ0 denote the distribution over initial promises and let
W0 ⊆ R denote its support. It is convenient to state the planner’s problem in terms of utility, rather
than resource, variables. Given W0,d e ﬁne a utility allocation to be a sequence of functions z = {ut,v t}T
t=0
with ut : W0 × Θt+1 → U and vt : W0 × Θt+1 → V.H e r eut and vt give the utility obtained by an agent
from consumption and labour at date t as a function of that agent’s utility promise and shock history. An
individual utility allocation for an agent with initial promise w0 will be denoted z (w0)8.L e tC : U → R+
denote the inverse of u and Y : V → Y t h ei n v e r s eo fv. An individual utility allocation can be mapped
into a consumption-labour allocation using the functions C and Y . Denote an agent’s continuation utility















1−β [ϕ + Eθς] denote an upper bound for Us.
Having introduced notation, we now state the constraints imposed on the planner’s problem. First we
require that the planner delivers w0 to those entitled to w0. Formally, the planner must choose a utility
allocation z that satisﬁes the promise keeping condition,f o ra l lw0 ∈ W0
9
w0 = U0(z(w0)). (4)
Second since agents privately observe their histories of shocks, we require that the planner selects an
incentive-compatible utility allocation. We deﬁne a reporting strategy δ to be a sequence of functions
8The strict concavity of the problem ensures that it is optimal for a planner to treat all agents with the same utility promise
identically. Hence, there is no loss of generality in assuming that agents with the same promise receive the same allocation.
9We will assume throughout that for each w0 ∈ W0, there exists a utility allocation z such that w0 = U0(z).
8{δt}T
t=0 with δt : Θt → Θ. We interpret δt as mapping an agent’s history of shocks into a report concerning
her current shock. Let z(w0;δ) denote the composition of the individual utility allocation z(w0) and the
reporting strategy δ. This is also an individual utility allocation. Let δ∗ = {δ∗
t}T
t=0 denote the truthful
reporting strategy,w h e r ef o ra l lt, θt, δ∗
t(θt−1,θt)=θt. We invoke the Revelation Principle and, without
loss of generality, require that utility allocations induce agents to be truthful10. Thus, we restrict the
planner to choose utility allocations z that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition, for all w0 ∈ W0
∀δ : U0(z(w0;δ∗)) ≥ U0(z(w0;δ)). (5)
We will say that a utility allocation z = {ut,v t}T
t=0 is temporarily incentive-compatible if for all w0
∀t,θt−1,θ,θ0,u t(w0,θt−1,θ)+θvt(w0,θt−1,θ)+βUt+1(z(w0),θt−1,θ) (6)
≥ ut(w0,θt−1,θ0)+θvt(w0,θt−1,θ0)+βUt+1(z(w0),θt−1,θ0).
The latter constraints imply that after each history of shocks, an agent is better oﬀ truthfully reporting
her shock, rather than lying and being truthful thereafter. (5) clearly implies (6) and, in a ﬁnite period
setting, the reverse implication is also true. We will require that the planner chooses utility allocations
satisfying the more tractable constraints in (6).
Finally, the planner will be mandated to keep the continuation utilities of agents above an exogenous
lower bound, Ut+1 < U
nat
t+1 at each date. Thus, utility allocations must satisfy, for all w0 ∈ W0,
∀t ∈ {0,...,T− 1},θ t,U t+1(z(w0)|θt) ≥ Ut+1. (7)
Deﬁne Wt =[ Ut+1,∞)∩ Range(Ut) to be the set of possible expected period t payoﬀs for an agent,
and let {Gt}T






























subject to: ∀w0, (4),(6) and (7).
10We assume throughout that the planner can commit to implementing a particular report contingent utility allocation.
9If z∗ = {u∗
t,v∗
t}T




t=0 ,Ψ0)). We say that a triple ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0) is consistent with resource
clearing if there exists a constrained eﬃcient allocation at ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0) that satisﬁes, for





C(ut(w0,θt)) − Y (vt(w0,θt))
¤
dπtdΨ0 + Gt =0 .
We now brieﬂy summarise some well known results about problem (9). In this problem, a single
planner allocates resources across a population of agents. Following Atkeson and Lucas (1992), (9) can
be formulated as a collection of component planning problems.I n e a c h o f t h e s e a component planner is
responsible for allocating resources only to those agents with a speciﬁc initial utility promise of w0.E a c h
component planner delivers w0, respecting incentive compatibility and the lower bound on continuation
utilities, at minimal cost, where cost is computed using a sequence of intertemporal prices {qt}T−1
t=0 ∈ RT
+. qt
may be interpreted as the social shadow price of period t+1 consumption in terms of period t consumption.11
Formally, the component planners solve:
















subject to : (4), (6) and (7),
where Q0 =1and, for t ≥ 1, Qt :≡
t−1 Y
s=0
qt. These planners can be thought of as trading claims to future
consumption amongst themselves at the price qt in period t. Lemma 1 links this component planning
formulation to problem (9).
Lemma 1 Fix ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0). Suppose there exists a utility allocation z and a sequence of
intertemporal prices {qt}T−1
t=0 such that:






C(ut(w0,θt)) − Y (vt(w0,θt))
¤
dπtdΨ0 + Gt =0and
11In Albanesi and Sleet (2004) we show that if Ψ0 is consistent with resource clearing, then the associated constrained
eﬃcient allocation also solves a “primal problem” in which the planner maximises a Pareto-weighted aggregate of agent
utilities subject to a resource constraint, incentive-compatibility and utility bound constraints. Conversely, any allocation that
solves such a primal problem is also the solution to a dual problem (9) with an appropriately set utility promise distribution
Ψ0.M o r e o v e r ,t h i sΨ0 is consistent with resource clearing. In the primal problem qt is the shadow price of consumption at
date t +1in terms of consumption at date t.
102. for all w0, z(w0) solves the corresponding component planning problem (10).
Then, z is constrained eﬃcient at ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0) and ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0) is con-
sistent with resource clearing.
Proof: See Atkeson and Lucas (1992). ¥
The component planning problem (10) is recursive in the agent’s utility promise. We reformulate it
to take advantage of this recursivity. We then re-express Conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 1 as equilibrium
conditions for a recursive component planner economy. This recursive formulation is a convenient ﬁrst step
towards obtaining our main implementation result.
Fix a triple ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0) and, hence, the sequence {Wt}T
t=0.D e ﬁne a utility allocation rule
to be a collection of functions ζ = {{ϕt,ςt,ωt+1}T−1
t=0 ,ϕ T,ςT} with ϕt : Wt × Θ → U, ςt : Wt × Θ → V and
ωt+1 : Wt × Θ → Wt+1. The functions ϕt(wt,θt), ςt(wt,θt))a n dωt+1(wt,θt) represent, respectively, the
utility from current consumption, labour supply, and the period t+1utility promise assigned to an agent
with current utility promise wt and shock θt. A utility allocation rule recursively induces a utility allocation
as follows. Given ζ a n da ni n i t i a lu t i l i t yp r o m i s ew0 ∈ W0,d e ﬁne wt+1(w0,θt)=ωt+1(wt(w0,θt−1),θt),
then for all t, w0 and θt−1 set ut(w0,θt)=ϕt(wt(w0,θt−1),θt) and vt(w0,θt)=ςt(wt(w0,θt−1),θt).T h u s ,
the utility allocation rule uses utility promises to summarise past information. We denote with z(ζ,w0)
the individual utility allocation induced by ζ from w0.
In the recursive formulation of (10), the component planner’s problem in period t ∈ {0,...,T− 1} is:





[C(ϕ(θ)) − Y (ς(θ)) + qtBt+1(ω(θ))]dπ (11)
subject to the temporary incentive-compatibility constraint:
∀θ,θ0 : ϕ(θ)+θς(θ)+βω(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ0)+θς(θ0)+βω(θ0),( 1 2 )





In the terminal period T, the component planner solves:





[C(ϕ(θ)) − Y (ς(θ))]dπ (14)
11subject to the temporary incentive-compatibility constraint:
∀θ,θ0 : ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ0)+θς(θ0),( 1 5 )





The solution to problems (11) and (14) deﬁnes a utility allocation rule, ζ∗. By a standard argument
z(ζ∗,w 0) attains the inﬁmum in (10). The following pair of lemmas provide some basic characterisation of
this sequence of value functions {Bt}T
t=0 and of ζ∗.
Lemma 2 Each Bt, t ∈ {0,...,T}, is increasing and strictly convex.
Proof: See Appendix. ¥






T} that solves the recur-




t+1(wt,·)} attain the inﬁma in (11); for each wT ∈ WT,t h ef u n c t i o n s{ϕ∗
T(wT,·),ς∗
T(wT,·)} attain
the inﬁma in (14).




3. For each t, there exist functions {c∗
t,y∗
t,B∗










Proof: See Appendix. ¥
The ﬁnal part of Lemma 3 re-expresses the optimal labour supply, consumption and component plan-
ner’s continuation cost, in the recursive component planner problem, as functions of the component plan-






T} ar e s o u r c ea l l o c a -
tion rule. It uses planner costs, rather than utility promises, to summarise the past. We also deﬁne
Y∗
t : Bt(Wt) ⇒ Y by
Y∗
t (b): ≡ {y : y = y∗
t(b,e θ) some e θ ∈ Θ} ⊆ Y. (18)
12Y∗
t (b) is the set of labour supplies available to an agent with utility promise B−1
t (b) at date t under ζ∗.
The optimal promise functions {ω∗
t+1}T−1
t=0 and the distribution Ψ0 induce a sequence of cross sectional
utility promise distributions Ψt+1 according to:




where B(Wt+1) denotes the Borel subsets of Wt+1. Additionally, ζ∗ and {Ψt}T
t=0 imply a sequence of






t(w,θ)) − Y (ς∗
t(w,θ))]dπdΨt + Gt.
Deﬁne a component planner economy, denoted ECP({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,{Gt}
T
t=0 ,Ψ0), to be a continuum of
component planners, an initial cross sectional distribution of utility promises Ψ0, a sequence of continuation
utility bounds {Ut+1}T−1
t=0 , a sequence of markets for one period ahead claims to consumption between
periods 0 and T−1, and a sequence of government consumptions {Gt}
T
t=0. We use our recursive formulation
of the component planning problems to deﬁne an equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 A sequence of intertemporal prices {qt}T−1







T},c o s tf u n c t i o n s{Bt}
T
t=0,w i t hBt : Wt → R, and a sequence of cross sectional distributions of utility
promises {Ψt}T
t=1 are an equilibrium of ECP({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 , {Gt}
T
t=0 , Ψ0) if:
1. {Bt}T−1




t+1} attain the inﬁma in the problems (11). {ϕ∗
T,ς∗
T} attain the inﬁma in the problems (14);




4. ∀t, Gt +
R
[C(ϕ∗
t(w,θ)) − Y (ς∗
t(w,θ))]dπdΨt =0 .
Conditions 1 to 4 of this deﬁnition restate the conditions of Lemma 1 in terms of a recursive component








t=0 ,Ψ0).W ew i l lc a l ls u c haζ∗ a constrained eﬃcient utility allocation rule.B yL e m m a
3, a constrained eﬃcient utility allocation rule ζ∗ can be equivalently expressed as a resource allocation
rule α∗.W ew i l lc a l lt h el a t t e raconstrained eﬃcient resource allocation rule.
133 Implementation
We now show that a component planner equilibrium, and, hence, the associated constrained eﬃcient
allocation, can be obtained as part of a competitive equilibrium in a market economy with taxes and
borrowing constraints. Agents are endowed with an initial stock of non-contingent claims b0. They enter
each period t with claims bt,t h e yw o r kyt, pay taxes and, in periods t ≤ T − 1, they allocate their
after-tax income between consumption ct and purchases of claims bt+1.I n t h e t e r m i n a l p e r i o d T,t h e y
simply consume all after-tax income. All market trades undertaken by an agent are publicly observable.
A government is exogenously assigned the sequence of spending levels {Gt}
T
t=0 and administers the tax
system, {Tt}T
t=0, that supplements this trading arrangement. The tax system conditions an agent’s tax
p a y m e n ti ne a c hp e r i o donly on her current labour income yt and her current stock of claims bt and not on
any other aspect of her past history. Thus, it is simple. We show that such a simple tax system implements
the constrained-eﬃcient allocation.






t=0), is a sequence of markets for one period ahead claims to consumption that open at each date
t ≤ T −1, a sequence of borrowing limits {bt+1}T−1
t=0 , an initial cross sectional distribution of claim holdings
Λ0, a sequence of government spending levels {Gt}
T
t=0, and a sequence of tax functions {Tt}
T
t=0 , with
Tt : Bt ×Y → R,w h e r ef o rt>0, Bt ≡ [bt,∞) and B0 denotes the support of Λ0.W e d e ﬁne a market
allocation rule to be a sequence of functions b a = {{b ct, b yt,b bt+1}T−1
t=0 ,b cT, b yT},w i t hb ct : Bt × Θ → R+,
b yt : Bt × Θ → Y,a n db bt+1 : Bt × Θ → Bt+1. The functions b ct(bt,θt), b yt(bt,θt) and b bt+1(bt,θt) represent,
respectively, consumption, labour supply, and savings at time t of an agent with current wealth b bt and
shock θt. A competitive equilibrium of the market economy EME({bt+1}T−1






Deﬁnition 2 A sequence of claims prices {b qt}T−1
t=0 ∈ RT
+, a market allocation rule b a = {{b ct, b yt,b bt+1}T−1
t=0 ,
b cT, b yT}, value functions {Vt}
T
t=0,w i t hVt : Bt → R, and a sequence of cross sectional distributions of claim
holdings {Λt+1}T−1







1. for t ∈ {0,...,T− 1}, Vt and Vt+1 satisfy:




[u(c(θ)) + θv(y(θ)) + βVt+1(b0(θ))]dπ (19)
14subject to, for each θ, b = c(θ) − y(θ)+Tt(b,y(θ)) + b qtb0(θ); VT satisﬁes
VT(b)= s u p
c:Θ→R+,y:Θ→Y
Z
[u(c(θ)) + θv(y(θ))]dπ (20)
subject to, for each θ, b = c(θ) − y(θ)+TT(b,y(θ));
2. {b ct, b yt,b bt+1} attain the suprema in the problems (19). {b cT, b yT} attain the suprema in (20);
3. ∀S ∈ B(Bt+1), Λt+1(S)=
R
1{b bt+1(b,θ)∈S}dπdΛt;
4. ∀t, Gt +
R
[b ct(b,θ) − b yt(b,θ)]dπdΛt =0 .
G i v e na ni n i t i a lw e a l t hb0, an equilibrium market allocation rule induces a utility allocation ˆ z(ˆ a,b0)
from b0.W ef o r m a l l yd e ﬁne an implementation as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 Let z∗ be a constrained eﬃcient utility allocation at ({Ut+1}T−1
t=0 ,Ψ0,{Gt}
T
t=0). We say that
z∗ is implemented by a competitive equilibrium in a market economy with taxes and borrowing limits
EME({bt+1}T−1











t=0) has a competitive equilibrium ξME = {{qt}T−1




t=0 } such that for each w0 ∈ W0, ˆ z(b a,f(w0)) = z∗(w0).











t=0),ξME) is said to be a ﬁscal implemen-
tation of z∗.
The ﬁrst condition in the deﬁnition describes how the initial wealth distribution is set in the market
economy. It requires that an agent’s initial claims in this economy be measurable with respect to the
agent’s initial utility promise in the planner’s problem. Intuitively, measurability implies that initial claim
holdings will reveal the agent’s initial utility promise to the government. The second condition is the
central one. It requires that if an agent is given initial claim holdings of f(w0) in the market economy,
then she will choose the constrained eﬃcient individual utility allocation z∗(w0).
153.1 Implementation in a two period economy
We now show that constrained eﬃcient utility allocations that are induced by the equilibria of component
planner economies can be implemented in market economies with taxes and borrowing limits. Although our
ﬁscal implementation result applies to economies of arbitrary ﬁnite length, the key insights are most easily
seen in a two period setting, and we will initially focus on this case. Subsequently, we extend our results to
time horizons T>1. Our approach is constructive. Given a component planner economy equilibrium, we
propose an initial distribution of claims and a candidate equilibrium claims price for the market economy.
We then derive a tax function and debt limits under which agents will be able to aﬀord the constrained
eﬃcient allocation from the component planner economy. The challenge will then lie in showing that the
agents in the market economy do in fact choose this allocation.
Formally, let ξCP = {q, ζ∗, {Bt}
1
t=0, Ψ1 } denote the equilibrium of a two period component planner
economy ECP(U,{Gt}
1





We set the candidate equilibrium price in the market economy to be q,a si nξCP, and set f = B0.W e
then structure the debt limits and tax system so that in period 0 an agent with wealth B0(w0) can aﬀord
to purchase each of the triples {C(ϕ∗
0(w0,θ)),Y(ς∗
0(w0,θ)),B 1(ω∗
1(w0,θ))}, θ ∈ Θ,w h i l e ,i np e r i o d1,a n
agent with wealth B1(w1) can aﬀord each pair {C(ϕ∗
1(w1,θ)),Y(ς∗
1(w1,θ))}, θ ∈ Θ.
Under this arrangement, an agent with utility promise w0 in the component planner economy is endowed
with an initial quantity of claims equal to B0(w0), the cost to a component planner of delivering w0.T h e
a g e n tc a nt h e na ﬀord the constrained eﬃcient allocation if she saves an amount equal to the component
planner’s continuation cost. This identiﬁcation of an agent’s savings with a component planner’s costs
is natural since the latter give the expected discounted net transfers to an agent under the constrained
eﬃcient allocation. It implies that an agent’s wealth will convey information about the agent’s past to the
government. Speciﬁcally, if for all w0 and θ, the agent saves B1(ω∗
1(w0,θ)), then the government will be able
to infer the agent’s continuation utility promise from B1 and, hence, the continuation allocation to which
the agent is entitled. Since the tax function will be designed to induce agents to choose this allocation, it
will be essential that taxes depend on wealth and this informational role of wealth will crucially inﬂuence
how wealth is taxed.





associated with ζ∗ to describe how the optimal tax system is constructed. In period 1,w es e tt h et a x
16functions so that for each b ∈ B1(W1) and y ∈ Y∗
1(b)




1 (b,y) ∈ {θ : y∗
1 (b,θ)=y}. It then follows that an agent with savings b ∈ B1(W1) in the market
economy can aﬀord each of the period 1 allocations potentially available to an agent with period 1 compo-
nent planner cost b under α∗. However, (21) only deﬁnes taxes for {b,y} ∈ Graph Y∗
1. To prevent agents
from choosing savings in period 0 outside of B1(W1)=[ B1(U),∞), we simply impose the borrowing limit
b = B1(U) and set B1 = B1(W1).F o rb ∈ B1 and y ∈ Y/Y∗
1(b), we select taxes so that for each θ:
u(c∗
1(b,θ)) + θv(y∗
1(b,θ)) ≥ u(b + y − T1(b,y)) + θv(y). (22)
This ensures that no agent would choose such a labour supply. The constrained eﬃcient utility allocation
rule does not prescribe how this should be done, and we have some ﬂexibility in selecting T1(b,·) over these
labour supplies. The procedure in period 0 is analogous, we set the tax function on Graph Y∗
0 so that the
agent can aﬀord the relevant constrained eﬃcient allocations. Speciﬁcally, for each b ∈ B0 = B1(W1),w e
set
T0(b,y∗




As in (22), we set taxes so that y ∈ Y/Y∗
0(b) will not be chosen by an agent with initial wealth b.
Do these tax functions and borrowing limits succeed in implementing the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion? To understand why they might fail, it is useful to compare the set of allocations available to an agent
from diﬀerent reporting strategies under α∗ (or ζ∗) to those available to an agent in the market economy.
Let ZCP(b0) denote the set of resource allocations available to an agent with initial planner cost b0 under
α∗, or, equivalently, initial utility promise B−1
0 (b0) under ζ∗.L e tZME(b0) be the set of allocations avail-
able to an agent with initial wealth b0 in the market economy. If ZME(b0)=ZCP(b0),t h e nw ec a nr e l y
on the incentive compatibility of the constrained eﬃcient utility allocation to ensure that this allocation
is implemented. Since the constrained eﬃcient allocation is aﬀordable in the market economy under the
candidate tax system, it follows that ZCP(b0) ⊆ ZME(b0). Deviations to choices outside of Graph Y∗
t ,
t =0 ,1 are either ruled out directly by the borrowing limit or rendered undesirable by the tax system, as
discussed above. Hence, we can restrict attention in the market economy to those allocations that remain
within the graphs of Y∗
t , t =0 ,1. These allocations comprise the set e ZME(b0),w h e r e :
e ZME(b0): ≡ {a = {ct,y t}1
t=0 : a ∈ ZME(b0) and for t =0 ,1,{bt,y t} ∈ GraphY∗
t
where b1 = b0 + y0 − T(b0,y 0) − c0}.
17Even after restricting attention to e ZME(b0), there remain allocations available to the agent in the market
economy that are unavailable to her under α∗,s ot h a tZCP(b0) ⊂ e ZME(b0). One or more of these may
be preferred to the constrained eﬃcient allocation. These allocations involve an agent selecting a labour
supply y = y∗
0(b,θ) that is constrained eﬃcient given the history (b,θ) and a savings level B∗
1(b0,y∗
0(b0,θ0))
that is constrained eﬃcient given some alternative history (b0,θ0). Since taxes are conditioned on current
wealth and labour earnings only, the tax system cannot, in period 1, “look back” to the previous period’s
labour earnings and verify consistency with this period’s wealth. Nor in period 0, can it prevent an agent
from choosing a savings level that is inconsistent, from the point of view of α∗, with that period’s labour
supply. Despite this, under the assumptions that an agent’s preferences are separable in consumption and
labour and shocks are i.i.d., our simple tax system works. The allocations in e ZME(b0)/ZCP(b0) are all
inferior to the constrained eﬃcient one.
Proposition 1 formally establishes the existence of a ﬁscal implementation for constrained eﬃcient
allocations. The main step of the proof involves splitting the period 0 problem of an agent in the market
economy, and of a planner in the component planner economy, into two stages. In the market economy,
an agent in the ﬁrst stage of period 0 selects a labour supply y0 and an after-tax quantity of resources,
x. In the second stage, she allocates these resources between current consumption and savings. In the
component planner economy, the planner ﬁrst assigns utilities from labour supply, ς0, and interim utility
promises, d. In the second stage of period 0, she allocates d between utility from consumption, ϕ0 and a
continuation utility promise, ω. Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix display timelines for both economies.
Proposition 1 Let ξCP = {q, ζ∗,{Bt}
1
t=0,Ψ1} be an equilibrium of the component planner economy
ECP(U,{Gt}
1
t=0 ,Ψ0). Then, the associated constrained eﬃcient utility allocation can be implemented by
a competitive equilibrium in a market economy with taxes and borrowing limits.
Proof: We directly construct a two period market economy with taxes and borrowing limits. We
assume a market for claims opens in period 0.W e s e t f = B0 and set Λ0 to satisfy condition (1) in
Deﬁnition 3. We set the government spending shocks to {Gt}
1
t=0, the debt limit to b = B0(U) and B1 to
[b,∞). The (candidate) equilibrium price in the market economy is set to q. The proof will be complete if
we can ﬁnd taxes that ensure that for each w0, an agent with initial wealth B0(w0) in the market economy




The argument is in three steps that work back from period 1 to period 0. In the ﬁrst step, a tax function
is found such that an agent with a stock of claims B1(w1) in period 1 will choose the same allocation as
18is awarded to an agent with a utility promise of w1 in the component planner economy. Period 0 is
divided into two stages in both the market and the component planner economy. In the second stage,
the intertemporal allocation of a given quantity of resources between time 0 consumption and claims is
obtained. In the ﬁrst stage, the labour-resource allocation is determined. The next step of the proof shows
that the agent’s second stage problem in the market economy is the dual of the corresponding second stage
component planner’s problem. In the ﬁnal step, a tax function is found such that an agent with an initial
stock of claims B0(w0) chooses the same labour and resource pair as would be awarded to an agent with
utility promise w0 in the component planner economy. We give the argument for Θ =[ θ,θ] and for ς∗
t(w0,·)
continuous each w0 ∈ W0. These assumptions simplify the exposition; neither is essential.
Period 1: A component planner with assigned utility promise w1 ∈ W1 solves the problem:
B1(w1)= i n f
ϕ:Θ→U,ς:Θ→V
Z





∀θ,e θ ∈ Θ,ϕ (θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(e θ)+θς(e θ).
Denote the policy functions that attain the inﬁma in the problems (24) by ς∗
1 : W1 × Θ → V and ϕ∗
1 :
W1 × Θ → U.L e ty∗
1 and c∗
1 denote the corresponding constrained eﬃcient resource allocation deﬁned, as





Next consider the ﬁrst period problem of an agent in the market economy confronting a tax function
T1. An agent with wealth b1 ∈ B1 solves:
V1(b1)= s u p
c:Θ→R+,y:Θ→Y
Z
[u(c(θ)) + θv(y(θ))]dπ (25)
subject to the budget constraint, for each θ ∈ Θ,
b1 = c(θ) − y(θ)+T1(b1,y(θ)).
Deﬁne Y∗
1(b) as in (18) and for b ∈ B1 and y ∈ Y∗
1(b) set T1(b1,y) according to (21). Since Θ =[ θ,θ]
and ς∗
1(B−1
1 (b),·) is continuous, Y∗
1(b) is an interval of the form [y1(b),y1(b)] with y1(b)=y∗
1(b,θ) and
y1(b)=y∗
1(b,θ).F o ry>y1(b1),s e tT1(b1,y) >T 1(b1,y1(b1)) a n ds u c ht h a tu(b1+y−T1(b1,y)) + θv(y) <
u(b1 +y1(b1) − T1(b1,y1(b1))) + θv(y1(b1)). For example, extend T1(b1,·) linearly on Y/Y∗
1(b1) by setting
19T1(b1,y)=T1(b1,y1(b1)) + τ1(y − y1(b1)),w h e r eτ1 =[ u0(c∗
1(b1,y1(b1))) − θv0(y1(b1))]/u0(c∗
1(b1,y1(b1))).
Similarly, for y<y 1(b1),s e tT1(b1,y) <T 1(b1,y1(b1)) a n ds u c ht h a tu(b1 + y − T1(b1,y)) + θv(y) <
u(b1 + y1(b1) − T1(b1,y1(b1))) + θv(y1(b1)). For example, set T1(b1,y)=T1(b1,y1(b1)) + τ1(y − y1(b1)),
where τ1 =[ u0(c∗
1(b1,y1(b1))) − θv0(y1(b1))]/u0(c∗
1(b1,y1(b1))).
Consider an agent in the market economy in period 1 with wealth b1 = B1(w1) and shock θ. Under
(21), if the agent chooses labour y∗
1(b1,θ0) ∈ Y∗
1(b1), she obtains consumption c∗
1(b1,θ0).B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
this provides the utility pair (ϕ∗
1(w1,θ0),ς ∗
1(w1,θ0)).B y c h o o s i n g d i ﬀerent labour levels in Y∗
1(b1),t h e
agent can obtain the entire set of period 1 report-contingent resource allocations available to an agent
with utility promise w1 in the component planner economy. Incentive compatibility implies that amongst
these, the agent obtains the highest payoﬀ from (c∗
1(b1,θ),y∗
1(b1,θ)).F o ry ∈ Y/Y∗
1(b1),c o n s i d e rﬁrst an
agent choosing y = y1(b1)+δ, δ>0. By construction, u(b1 + y − T1(b1,y)) + θv(y) <u (b1 + y1(b1) −
T1(b1,y1(b1))) + θv(y1(b1))+(θ−θ)(v(y)−v(y1(b1))) <u (b1+y1(b1) − T1(b1,y1(b1))) + θv(y1(b1)).T h u s ,
for all y>y1(b1), the agent is better oﬀ reducing her labour to y1(b1). By a similar argument the agent
would never choose y<y 1(b1). It follows that the agent will choose the allocation (c∗
1(b1,θ),y∗
1(b1,θ)) and,
hence, the utility pair (ϕ∗
1(w1,θ),ς ∗
1(w1,θ)).S i n c eb1 and θ were arbitrary, it follows that for all b0
1 ∈ B1




1,θ0)) when confronted with the tax function T1.T h e
agent’s value function in the market economy, V1,d e ﬁned in (25), then equals B−1
1 and, hence, is strictly
increasing.
Period 0: We divide the agent’s problem in the market economy into two stages. In the ﬁrst, the
agent chooses labour y0 and resources x. In the second, she allocates x between current consumption c0
and claims b1. Similarly, the component planner’s problem can be subdivided. In the ﬁrst stage, the agent
reports her shock and receives a utility from labor, ς0, and an interim utility promise d. In the second stage,
the planner allocates the interim promise between utility from current consumption ϕ0 and a continuation
utility promise w1.
Period 0, second stage: Consider the second stage problem of a component planner with interim
utility promise d ∈ D = {ϕ + βw : ϕ ∈ U,w∈ W1}:
X(d)= i n f
ϕ0∈U,w1∈W1
C(ϕ0)+qB1(w1) (26)
subject to: d = ϕ0 + βw1. The constraint set for each problem (26) is compact and the objective is
continuous. Hence, it has a solution. Also, X is strictly increasing. Let e ϕ∗
0 : D → U and e ω∗ : D → W1
denote policy functions that attain the inﬁma in the problems (26). Deﬁne the corresponding resource
20allocation functions by e c∗
0 and e b∗
1,w h e r ee c∗
0(X(d)) = C(e ϕ∗
0(d)) and e b∗
1(X(d)) = B1(e ω∗(d)).
Next consider the agent’s second stage problem in the market economy. The agent allocates x ≥ qb
units of resources across current consumption and savings to solve:
D(x)= s u p
c0∈R+,b1≥b
u(c0)+βV1(b1)
subject to x = c0 + qb1. The allocation (e c∗
0(x),e b∗
1(x)) is optimal for the agent in this problem. To see
this suppose that there was some alternative allocation (c0,b 0) such that x = c0 + qb0, c0 ∈ R+, b0 ≥ b and
u(c0)+βV1(b0) >d= X−1(x). Then, since d ∈ D,a n du and V1 are continuous and monotone, there
exists an allocation (c+,b +) with c+ ≤ c0 and b+ ≤ b0 with at least one of these inequalities strict such that
u(c+)+βV1(b+)=d. But then (u(c+),V 1(b+)) attains the interim utility promise d and has a cost strictly
less than x. This contradicts the optimality of e ϕ∗
0 and e ω∗ at d for the component planner’s problem.
Period 0, first stage: In this stage, a component planner utility promise w0 ∈ W0 solves:
B0(w0)= i n f
d:Θ→D,ς:Θ→V
Z





∀θ,θ0 ∈ Θ,d (θ)+θς(θ) ≥ d(θ0)+θς(θ0).
Denote the policy functions that attain the inﬁma in these problems by d∗
0 : W0 × Θ → D and ς∗
0 :





Next consider the ﬁrst stage problem of an agent in the market economy with initial wealth b0 ∈ B0,
B0 = B0(W0) under a tax function T0:
V0(b0)= s u p
xc:Θ→R+,y:Θ→Y
Z
[D(x(θ)) + θv(y(θ))]dπ (28)
subject to the budget constraint, for each θ ∈ Θ,
b0 = x(θ) − y(θ)+T0(b,y(θ)).
Deﬁne Y∗
0(b) as in (18). For each b0 ∈ B0,a n dθ,s e t
T0(b0,y(b0,θ)) = b0 + y(b0,θ) − x∗
0(b0,θ). (29)
21Since Θ =[ θ,θ] and ς∗
0(B−1
0 (b),·) is continuous, Y∗
0(b) is an interval of the form [y0(b),y0(b)].F o ry>y0(b0),
set T0(b0,y) >T 0(b0,y0(b0)) a n ds u c ht h a tD(b0 +y −T0(b0,y)) + θv(y) <D (b0 +y0(b0) − T0(b0,y0(b0)))
+ θv(y0(b0)). Similarly, for y<y 0(b0),s e tT0(b0,y) <T 0(b0,y0(b0)) a n ds u c ht h a tD(b0 + y − T0(b0,y))
+ θv(y) <D (b0 + y0(b0) − T0(b0,y0(b0))) + θv(y0(b0)). Then, the set of budget feasible labour and
resource combinations, (x0,y 0), for an agent with initial wealth b0 = B0(w0) and shock θ0 in the market
economy includes those available to an agent with initial promise w0 in the component planner problem.
By incentive-compatibility, (x∗
0(b0,θ),y∗
0(b0,θ)) is optimal for the agent amongst these. In the market
economy, the agent can also increase her labour above y0(b0) o rr e d u c ei tb e l o wy0(b0). However, as in







Combining the previous arguments, an agent who confronts the price q a n dt h et a xs y s t e m{T0,T 1},
w h oi se n d o w e dw i t has t o c ko fc l a i m sb0 = B0(w0) and who receives the shock θ will select an initial labor
and resource allocation equal to the allocation (y∗
0(b0,θ),x ∗
0(b0,θ)). Next, the agent allocates resources in
each state θ, x∗
0(b0,θ), intertemporally between current consumption and claims. Her choices, will coincide
with those made by the component planner: c∗
0(b0,θ) and b∗(b0,θ). Finally, the agent enters period 1, with
wealth b∗(b0,θ), receives the period 1 shock and makes consumption and labour choices that once again
match those of the component planner. Hence, an agent’s optimal policy functions in the market economy
evaluated at an initial wealth b0 = B0(w0) induce the allocation z(ζ∗,w 0). ¥
Remark 1: The key step in this proof is the decomposition of the agent’s and the component planner’s
period 0 problem into two stages, where the only link between these stages is the quantity of resources,
x∗
0, or interim utility promise, d∗
0, that is passed from the ﬁrst to the second. Step 2 of the proof shows
that although the intertemporal allocation of resources is made by the agent in the market economy, when
given the appropriate quantity of resources, she makes the same choice as the component planner.
The simple decomposition that underlies this argument is disrupted if, given the quantity of resources
x∗
0 or the interim utility promise d∗
0, the agent’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the second
stage of period 0 depends upon either her labour supply or her preference shock in the ﬁrst stage. The
ﬁrst case occurs when preferences are non-separable in labour and consumption, the second when the
preference shock θ is persistent. In both cases, neither x∗
0 nor d∗
0 is a suﬃcient state variable for the stage
2 intertemporal allocation problem and the decomposition fails. We return to the persistent shock case in
the concluding remarks.
22Remark 2: Our deﬁnition of a ﬁscal implementation requires only that, when given an appropriate
initial endowment of wealth, agents choose the allocations induced by the constrained-eﬃcient utility
allocation rule ζ∗. The tax functions constructed above do more than this. They implement the complete
rule ζ∗.T os e et h ed i ﬀerence, let B∗
1 :≡ {b1 ∈ B1 : b1 = B∗
1(b0,y 0), (b0,y 0) ∈ Graph Y∗
0} denote the set of
possible period 1 continuation costs for the component planner under ζ∗. Recall that Graph Y∗
0 equals all
those initial planner cost and labour supply pairs that occur under ζ∗. The initial distribution of wealths
and the period 0 tax function in our ﬁscal implementation imply that each agent should select a savings
level b1 ∈ B∗
1. The tax system constructed in the above proof induces an agent with savings b1 to choose
the period 1 allocation {c∗
1(b1,·),y∗
1(b1,·)} prescribed by the utility allocation rule ζ∗.I td o e st h i sat every
b1 ∈ B1 and not just at those in B∗
1.T h i si ss u ﬃcient for implementation and conveniently pins down T1
for all savings levels. It is also informationally parsimonious since the government does not need to know
B∗
1 in period 1.
However, if the government did know B∗
1, it could use this information to design an even simpler tax
system. Speciﬁcally, if an agent entered period 1 with wealth b1 / ∈ B∗
1, it would be immediately revealed to
the government that the agent had taken actions inconsistent with the constrained eﬃcient allocation. The
agent could then be penalised in the same way that agents who choose savings levels and labour supplies
outside of Graph Y∗
t are penalised by the tax system constructed in the proof. In short, it is not important
what allocation an agent receives if she chooses b1 / ∈ B∗
1, provided that that allocation discourages her from
choosing such a b1 in the ﬁrst place. We construct examples along these lines in Section 5.






Similarly at date 1, E[T1(b1,y∗
1(b1,θ1))|b1]=0 . Thus, the tax system is solely redistributive and raises
no revenue to ﬁnance the government spending levels {Gt}1
t=0. In our implementation, such spending
is ﬁnanced via an appropriate setting of the initial distribution of claims. In particular, to extract net
resources from the population of agents, the government must hold claims against them at date 0.
3.2 Implementation in economies of arbitrary ﬁnite length.
The argument in Proposition 1 is easily extended to economies of arbitrary ﬁnite length. The proof involves
a straightforward iteration on the argument in Proposition 1.




Then, the associated constrained eﬃcient utility allocation can be implemented by a competitive equilib-
rium in a market economy with taxes and borrowing limits.
4 The Optimal Pattern of Wedges
We now obtain the key properties of constrained-eﬃcient allocations. In particular, we characterise their
implications for the pattern of wedges between individual and social marginal rates of substitution and
marginal rates of transformation. These properties are well known in the literature and we proceed heuris-
tically. However, they are an essential precursor to the analysis of optimal tax functions that follows.
For expositional ease, we focus on the case Θ =[ θ,θ] and assume that the functions that comprise






T}, are piecewise diﬀerentiable in θ.12 We
assume that π admits a continuous density ρ. As a notational convention, if x : Θ → R is a piecewise
diﬀerentiable function, then we denote its derivative at θ by ˙ x(θ).D e ﬁne the function U : Θ → R by:
U(θ): ≡ ϕ(θ)+θς(θ)+βω(θ). (31)
By standard arguments, for example Salanié (1997), {ϕ,ς,ω} is incentive compatible if and only if:
˙ U(θ)=ς(θ) a.e. θ, (32)
ς (θ) non-decreasing in θ. (33)
We formulate the period t ∈ {0,...,T − 1} problem of a component planner with utility promise wt as
an optimal control problem.13 To obtain the component planner’s period t Hamiltonian, we use (31) to
replace ϕ with U and we drop the constraint that ς (θ) is non-decreasing14:
Hwt
t (U,ς,ω;χ,λ,φ)(θ)=−χ(U(θ) − wt)ρ(θ) − λ(θ)ς(θ)+
[C(U(θ) − θς(θ) − βω(θ)) − Y (ς(θ)) + qtBt+1(ω(θ))]ρ(θ)+φ(θ)(ω(θ) − Ut)ρ(θ).
Here χ is the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint wt =
R θ
θ U(θ)ρ(θ)dθ, λ is the costate variable
associated with the incentive compatibility constraint (32) and φ(θ) is the multiplier on the constraint
12Kahn (1993) provides conditions for an optimal static mechanism to be absolutely continuous.
13The period T problem can be similarly formulated. For brevity we omit it.
14See Salanié (1997) for suﬃcient conditions to ensure that it is not binding.
24ω(θ) ≥ Ut. The component planner’s problem in period t can then be written as:







Denote the optimal multipliers by {χ∗
t,λ ∗
t,φ ∗
t}.T h e ﬁrst order conditions from (34) imply a particular
pattern of wedges. We describe this pattern in terms of the constrained eﬃcient resource allocation rule.













where bt = Bt(wt).T h u s ,i f˙ λ
∗
t(wt,·)/ρ(·) is non-constant then an agent’s marginal utility of consumption
is not equated across states and insurance against preference shocks is imperfect. As observed in Lemma 3,
ϕ∗
t, and, hence, c∗
t are monotone in θ. Strict monotonicity stems from the binding incentive-compatibility
constraint.15
the effort wedge: The ﬁrst order conditions for U(θ) and ς(θ) at t, re-expressed in terms of
















represents the wedge between this marginal rate of transformation and the agent’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution. When λ∗
t(wt,θ) > 0, it is positive.
the intertemporal wedge: Combining the ﬁrst order conditions for U(θ), ω(θ) and the envelope
















where bt = Bt(wt). Assuming that the lower bound on ω∗
t+1(wt,θ) does not bind and φ∗
t(wt,θ)=0 ,w e














t(wt,θ)=0 . From Lemma 3, c
∗
t is non-increasing. It follows
that ˙ λ
∗
t(wt) is non-increasing and if λ
∗
t(w0,θ) 6=0for some θ,t h e n˙ λ
∗
t(w0,·) is non-constant.
25This inequality is strict if u0(c∗
t+1(B∗
t+1(bt,θ),·)) is non-constant, which is the case in this problem when
the incentive-compatibility constraint binds. Thus, there is a wedge between the social intertemporal





The insurance and eﬀort wedges occur in each period, and the resulting implications for optimal non-
linear income taxation are well known from the static public ﬁnance literature based on Mirrlees (1971). If
a consumption-labour allocation (c∗
t(bt,θ),y∗
t(bt,θ)) is to be implemented at date t with the tax function






s.t. c + Tt(bt,y)=y + bt − qt+1B∗
t+1(bt,θ).











where bt = Bt(wt) and the marginal income tax at (bt,y∗
t(bt,θ)) equals the eﬀort wedge.
The intertemporal wedge was ﬁrst derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985).
Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) establish that this wedge is present in a very large class of
private information economies. This wedge stems from the adverse eﬀect of savings on incentives. Higher
saving at date t exacerbates the incentive problem at t+1, s i n c ei tr e d u c e st h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e na na g e n t ’ s
consumption and her labour supply in that period. The intertemporal wedge adjusts for this additional
marginal social cost of saving. Just as the eﬀort wedge gives rise to positive marginal labour income taxes,
it is natural to infer that the intertemporal wedge provides a rationale for asset taxation. Speciﬁcally,





t+1(bt,θ),·)} ∈ arg max
ct,bt+1,ct+1
u(ct)+βEtu(ct+1)










Hence, assuming that the function Tt+1 is diﬀerentiable in its ﬁrst argument, Tt+1 must be consistent


















































This decomposition of the eﬀect of marginal taxation of wealth on the intertemporal trade-oﬀ illustrates
two ways in which asset taxation can generate an intertemporal wedge. The most direct way is to reduce





> 0. The second










> 0. This discourages savings in period t by making non-
contingent claims a less eﬀective hedge against period t +1consumption risk. It also boosts incentives in
period t +1by reinforcing the covariance between consumption and labour income. Crucially, (40) shows
that there is no presumption that the intertemporal wedge translates into positive expected marginal asset
taxes. In addition, for the after-tax return on assets to covary with labour earnings and consumption, the
marginal asset tax must be stochastic. Speciﬁcally, it must depend on labour earnings in period t +1 ,
which are uncertain when the savings choice is made in period t.
We explore these issues in the following section. We present several examples that reveal the respective
roles of the expected and the stochastic components of marginal asset taxation in generating the intertem-
poral wedge. The ﬁr s te x a m p l es h o w st h a ti ti sessential that marginal asset taxes generate a positive
covariance between after-tax returns on assets and labour earnings. Absent this covariance, an agent could
increase her lifetime utility with a deviation in which she saves more in period t and reduces her labour
supply in all states in period t +1 , relative to the constrained eﬃcient allocation. Moreover, in this ﬁrst
example, the optimal tax system implies that the expected marginal asset tax is equal to zero. The subse-
quent examples illustrate the link between the dependence of the constrained-eﬃcient labour allocation in
period t +1on wealth and a positive expected marginal asset tax. Lastly, we discuss the role of the lower
bound on continuation utility.
5 Revealing Examples
We now present three examples in order of complexity of the physical environment. As we make the
physical environment more complicated, the information conveyed by an agent’s wealth changes, leading
to corresponding changes in the tax system.
275.1 Example 1: Zero Expected Marginal Asset Tax
For our ﬁrst two examples, we consider a stripped down version of the model in the previous section. To
focus attention on the role of marginal asset taxation, we assume that in period 0 an agent consumes, but
does not work. In period 1, the agent receives a preference shock from Θ = {θ,θ}, θ < θ, chooses a labour
supply from the discrete set Y = {y,y}, y < y and consumes.
Component planner’s problem. The representative component planner faces an equilibrium in-
tertemporal price q and solves the following problem16:
Period 0 B0(w0)=i n f {ϕ,ω} C(ϕ)+qB1 (ω)
s.t. w0 = ϕ + βω
(41)
and
Period 1 B1 (w1)=i n f {ϕ,ς}
P




∀θ,θ0, ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ0)+θς(θ0).
Following the notation in previous sections, let ζ∗ = {ϕ∗
0,ϕ ∗
1,ς∗
1,ω∗} denote the solution to these problems.
As o l u t i o nζ∗ and the value function B1 have the following properties.
Lemma 4 Assume that C0(0) = 0 and that C0 is strictly convex.
1. There exist two numbers w1 and w1 with w1 < w1, such that:
(a) for w1 > w1, ς∗(w1,θ)=v(y),f o rw1 < w1, ς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y).
(b) for w1 >w 1, ς∗(w1,θ)=v(y),f o rw1 <w 1, ς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y).
2. B1 is piecewise concave and diﬀerentiable except at w1 and w1.
3. ω∗ is increasing in w0.T h e r ee x i s tt w on u m b e r sw0 and w0 with w0 ≤ w0, such that:
(a) for w0 > w0, ω∗(w0) > w1.
(b) for w0 <w 0, ω∗(w0) <w 1.
(c) for w0 ∈ (w0,w0), ω∗(w0) ∈ (w1,w1).
16We do not impose a lower bound on continuation utility for this example. We discuss the implications of this bound below.
28In our ﬁr s te x a m p l e ,w es p e c i a l i s et h i se n v i r o n m e n tf u rther by assuming that the initial distribution
over utility promises is degenerate at b w0 ∈ (w0,w0). Consequently, we treat ϕ∗
0 and ω∗ as numbers. The
assumption that b w0 ∈ (w0,w0) ensures that the problem is interesting, since then ς∗
1(ω∗,θ)=v(y) and
ς∗
1(ω∗,θ)=v(y). In this case, standard arguments establish that the incentive-compatibility constraint














1} denote the associated constrained eﬃcient resource allocation rule. In this example,
since consumption and the continuation planner cost are identical across agents in period 0 and since
consumption and labour in period 1 diﬀer across agents only to the extent that agents receive diﬀerent








1(ω∗,θ)). Using the notation from
Remark 2, B∗
1 = {B∗
1} and, by assumption, Y∗
1(b∗
1)=Y = {y,y}.T h eﬁrst order conditions for ϕ∗
0, ϕ∗
1, ω∗

















Implementation. In the corresponding market economy, agents are endowed with b0 = B0(b w0) claims
in period 0. They allocate this wealth between current consumption c0 and claims b1 that trade at price
q. They do not pay taxes in period 0.I np e r i o d1, they receive the preference shock, supply labour, pay
taxes and consume. The tax function is given by T(b1,y 1). The agent’s problem is:
V0(b0)=s u p {c0,c1,y1,b1} u(c0)+βE[u(c1(θ)) + θv(y1(θ))]
s.t. b0 = c0 + qb1
∀θ : b1 = c1(θ)+T(b1,y 1(θ)) − y1(θ).
We denote the solution to the agents’ problem in the market economy by: b a = {b c0, b c1, b y1, b b1}.
To implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation, the government selects T (b1,y 1) to ensure b a = a∗.
Given our setting of the initial wealth levels and the absence of taxation in period 0,t og u a r a n t e et h a tt h e







29Incentive-compatibility of the constrained eﬃcient allocation then immediately guarantees that if the agent
saves B∗
1, she will choose the constrained eﬃcient labour supply:










Using (44), the constrained eﬃcient allocation pins down the tax function on B∗
1 = {B∗
1}.H o w e v e r ,
agents in the market economy can choose savings levels in period 0 that are diﬀerent from B∗
1.O u r t a x
function must be deﬁned for these as well. Since these savings levels represent and reveal deviations from
constrained eﬃcient behaviour, the tax function must be set so as to discourage them. One way to do this,
following the proof of Proposition 1, is to use the entire constrained eﬃcient allocation rule to set taxes at
all possible period 1 wealth levels. However, as Remark 2 indicates there are other ways to discourage such
savings choices. One simple approach is to use tax functions that are linear in wealth and of the form:
T(b,y)=T0(y)+T1(y)b. (47)
We show in this section that there is a unique tax function, b T(b,y)=b T0(y)+b T1(y)b, within this class
that implements the constrained eﬃcient allocation. Moreover, we also show that all optimal tax functions
diﬀerentiable in wealth satisfy ∂T
∂b(B∗
1,y)=b T1(y). Thus, the constrained eﬃcient allocation determines
both the tax level and the marginal asset tax at B∗
1.
The tax function (47) has four parameters: {T0(y),T 1(y)}y∈Y. Equation (44) provides two restric-










This provides a third restriction. At ﬁrst sight the restrictions (44), (47) and (48) seem to be suﬃcient to
determine an optimal tax system. If a tax system satisﬁes them, then the constrained-eﬃcient allocation
satisﬁes the agent’s optimality conditions (45), (46) and (48). However, we show that this conclusion is
false. We do so by presenting a tax function that satisﬁes the conditions (44), (47) and (48) but fails to
implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation. This tax function is the simplest and most natural candidate
for generating the intertemporal wedge: it is separable in wealth and labour supply and the marginal asset
tax does not depend on labor. It fails because it admits a proﬁtable deviation in which the agent saves
more than B∗
1 in period 0 and works too little in period 1.
30Lemma 5 a∗ cannot be implemented in a market economy with a tax function of the form T0(y)+T1b.A
labour-contingent marginal asset tax is necessary for implementation.
Proof: Assume instead that a∗ can be implemented with a tax function of the form T0(y)+T1b.












=( 1− b T1)B∗
1 − c∗
1(θ)+y and b T0 (y)=( 1− b T1)B∗
1 − c∗
1(θ)+y. (50)
The binding incentive-compatibility constraint (42) in the component planner’s problem implies that an
agent can obtain a lifetime expected utility equal to that from a∗ by choosing an alternative allocation in
which she saves B∗
1, and selects y and c∗
1(θ) in all states in period 1. The binding incentive compatibility
constraint also implies c∗
1(θ) <c ∗
1(θ). It follows that:
qu0(c∗
0)=β(1 − b T1)E[u0(c∗
1)] <β (1 − b T1)u0(c∗
1(θ)).
Thus, a∗ i sd o m i n a t e db ya na l l o c a t i o ni nw h i c ht h ea g e n ts a v e sB∗
1 + ε (for ε>0 and small) and chooses
y regardless of her shock. But this contradicts the optimality of a∗ for the agent in the market economy.
Thus, the tax function b T fails to implement a∗ and a labour-contingent marginal asset tax is necessary for
implementation. ¥
In Lemmas 6 and 7 we identify and characterise the unique tax function within the class (47) that
does implement the constrained-eﬃcient allocation in the market economy. The crucial property of this
tax function is that the marginal asset tax depends on labour earnings17. In particular, it is set to equate







Thus, the agent does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase savings at time 0 irrespective of her choice of labour
at time 1. This marginal asset tax has a negative covariance with consumption and is zero on average.
17This ﬁnding is related to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003), who consider the design of optimal disability insurance. They
show that disability beneﬁts must be made contingent on an age dependent asset level.
31Lemma 6 Assume that all agents have initial wealth b0 = B0(b w0) and that there are no taxes levied in


















T0 =( 1 − T1)B∗
1 + y − c∗
1(θ), (53)
T0 =( 1 − T1)B∗
1 + y − c∗
1(θ).
Then the tax function
T(y,b)=T0 + T1b (54)
T(y,b)=T0 + T1b
implements the allocation a∗ in a market economy with taxes. Additionally, this is the unique tax function
in the class T(b,y)=T0(y)+T1(y)b that does so.
Proof: See Appendix. ¥
Lemma 7 The tax function (54) satisﬁes:
1. T1 > T1.
2. T1π(θ)+T1π(θ)=0 .
Proof: The ﬁrst condition follows from the deﬁnitions of T1 and T1 and the fact that c∗
1(θ) <c ∗
1(θ).
For the second condition, combine the deﬁnitions of T1 and T1 with the component planner’s intertemporal
















Although the results in Lemmas 6 and 7 have been derived for a linear wealth tax, similar arguments
hold for any tax function diﬀerentiable in wealth. Formally, we have the following result.
32Lemma 8 Assume that all agents have initial wealth b0 = B0(b w0) and that there are no taxes levied in
































The proof is almost identical to that used to obtain the second part of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 and is
omitted.
5.2 Example 2: More Zero Expected Marginal Asset Taxes
Component planner’s problem We generalise the previous example to allow for heterogeneity in agents’
initial utility promises. The component planner’s problem the same as in Example 1, except that now
W0 =( w0,w0). This initial heterogeneity in utility promises results in diﬀerences in consumption across
agents in the constrained eﬃcient allocation. However, since we restrict attention to w0 ∈ (w0,w0),a s
in Example 1, an agent’s period 1 constrained eﬃcient labour allocation does not depend on an agent’s




1} denote the constrained eﬃcient resource allocation rule for
this problem, where these functions are deﬁned as in Lemma 3. For this problem, B∗




Implementation We set agents’ initial wealth in the market economy according to: b0(w0)=B0(w0).
Once again this setting of initial wealths, coupled with the absence of taxes in period 0, implies that an
agent with initial wealth b0 must be induced to save B∗
1(b0) ∈ B∗
1.A ﬀordability of the period 1 allocation
then pins down taxes on Graph Y∗
1 according to:
T(b1,y∗
1(b1,θ)) = b1 + y(b1,θ) − c∗
1(b1,θ). (56)
Since B∗
1 is a larger set in this example relative to the last, this condition determines the tax function across
a broader range of wealth levels. As before deviations to savings levels outside of B∗
1 are inconsistent with
constrained eﬃcient behaviour and such deviations need to be discouraged. Lemma 8 suggests that if T
is diﬀerentiable then, in order to rule out joint deviations, it will need to satisfy the state-by-state Euler
33equations (55) at each b1 ∈ B∗
1. We now show that the planner’s optimality conditions directly imply that
T satisﬁes (55) on B∗
1.
Since W0 =( w0,w0), the constrained eﬃcient labor allocation does not depend on promised utility.
It then follows from the component planner’s period 1 incentive and promise keeping constraints that
w1 = ϕ∗
1(w1,θ)+K(θ)=ϕ∗
1(w1,θ)+K(θ),f o rw1 ∈ W∗
1 =( w1,w1),w h e r eK(θ) and K(θ) are constants
that do not depend on w1.T h u s , ∂ϕ∗
1(w1,θ)/∂w1 =1for each θ on W∗
1. Substituting B1(w1) for b1 in
(56), totally diﬀerentiating with respect to w1 and using c∗
1 (B1(w1),θ)=C (ϕ∗





















































∂b ], ∀b1 ∈ B∗
1, is zero. The argument is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.
This example provides an illustration of the more general result obtained in the proof of Proposition 1.
Simply setting taxes so that agents are induced to choose the constrained eﬃcient consumption and labour
allocation given their wealth level at time 1 is enough to rule out joint labour and savings deviations. Here,
this implies that the Euler equation holds state by state at the appropriate wealth level, leading to a zero
expected marginal asset tax. This example, however, is special in that the ﬁrst period constrained eﬃcient
labour allocation does not depend on the agent’s continuation utility promise. Equivalently, in the market
economy, the agent’s labour supply in each θ state is independent of b1 ∈ B∗
1. More generally, this is not
true. Agent’s with diﬀerent period 1 utility promises or wealth levels will be entitled to diﬀerent labour
supply allocations. In the next example, we show that when this happens the expected marginal asset tax
will not be zero.
345.3 Example 3: Positive Expected Marginal Asset Taxes
We extend the previous example to a continuous support for the preference shock in period 1,s ot h a t
Θ ∈ [θ,θ]. We assume that π admits a strictly positive density ρ. This extension implies that the
constrained eﬃcient labour allocation in period 1 varies across agents with diﬀerent initial promised utilities.
The initial period of the component planner’s problem is as before. In period 1, the component planner
solves:
B1 (w1)=i n f ϕ:Θ→U,ς:Θ→{v,v}
R θ




∀θ,θ0, ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ0)+θς(θ0).
The incentive-compatibility constraints imply that if ς(θ)=ς(θ0),t h e nϕ(θ)=ϕ(θ0) for any θ,θ0 ∈ Θ.
They also imply that ς must be monotone. Thus, the component planning problem in period 1 can be
rewritten as:
B1 (w1)=i n f {ϕ,ϕ∈U,
b θ∈[θ,θ]}
[{C(ϕ) − Y (v)}Π(b θ)+{C(ϕ) − Y (v)}(1 − Π(b θ))]
s.t. w1 = {ϕΠ[b θ]+v
R b θ
θ θdπ} + {ϕ(1 − Π[b θ]) + v
R θ
b θ θdπ},
ϕ +b θv = ϕ +b θv,
where Π[b θ]=
R b θ
θ dπ and v = v(y) and v = v(y). In this problem, the component planner chooses a cut oﬀ
value for shocks b θ and a utility allocation of the form: {ϕ(θ),ς(θ)} = {ϕ,v}, θ<ˆ θ and {ϕ(θ),ς(θ)} = {ϕ,v},




1} denote optimal choices of ϕ, ϕ and ˆ θ as functions of the component planner’s period 1
utility promise w1.18 We modify the notation for a constrained eﬃcient resource allocation rule accordingly












before, we construct the optimal tax function on B∗
1 so that the constrained eﬃcient allocation is aﬀordable:
T(b1,y)=b1 + y − c∗
1(b1),( 6 0 )
T(b1,y)=b1 + y − c∗
1(b1).
The function θ∗
1 summarises the eﬀect of diﬀerent wealth levels in B∗
1 upon the agent’s ﬁrst period
labour allocation. We will refer to the dependence of θ∗
1 on b1 as a wealth eﬀect.L e m m a 9 p r o v i d e s a
suﬃcient condition for θ∗
1 to be non-constant over all b1 ∈ B∗
1.
18If these choices are not unique, we take a selection from the component planner’s optimal policy correspondence.
35Lemma 9 If C00/C0 is non-decreasing and b1 and b0
1 are in B∗
1,t h e nb θ
∗
1(b1) 6= b θ
∗
1(b1).
Proof: See Appendix. ¥
Remark 4: If the agent’s utility function u is CARA or CRRA with coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o1,t h e nC00/C0 is non-decreasing.
We now show that the presence of wealth eﬀects on the labour allocation implies that the expected
marginal asset tax is not zero. This a straightforward implication of two properties of the tax system.
First, as observed in Remark 3, an agent’s expected taxes in each period are zero provided she selects the
prescribed labour allocation. Second, the agent pays higher taxes at all wealth levels in the high labour
income state.
To derive implications for marginal asset taxes, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tb yt h eﬁrst property, for each b1 ∈ B∗
1
T(b1,y)Π[θ∗
1(b1)] + T(b1,y)(1 − Π[θ∗
1(b1)]) (61)
=( b1 + y − c∗
1(b1))Π[θ∗
1(b1)] + (b1 + y − c∗
1(b1))(1 − Π[θ∗
1(b1)]) = 0.
Next consider an agent who increases her savings from b∗
1 ∈ B∗
1 to b∗
1 + δ ∈ B∗
1, but keeps her labour
allocation the same. Then, the change in the agent’s expected tax payment is given by
∆T ≡ E[T(b1 + δ,y∗
1(b1,θ)) − T(b1,y∗
1(b1,θ))]
= E[T(b1 + δ,y∗
1(b1,θ)) − T(b1 + δ,y∗
1(b1 + δ,θ))]
=( T(b1 + δ,y) − T(b1 + δ,y))(Π[θ∗
1(b1)] − Π[θ∗
1(b1 + δ)], (62)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (61). It follows that since T(b1 + δ,y) >T(b1 + δ,y), the sign of ∆T
depends on ∆Π ≡ Π[θ∗
1(b1)] − Π[θ∗
1(b1 + δ)]. This term is a function of the eﬀect of ﬁrst period wealth on
the labor allocation. By Lemma 9 and the fact that ρ(θ) > 0,w h e nC00/C0 is non-decreasing, ∆Π is always
non-zero and, hence, the agent’s tax payment changes if she alters her savings level without correspondingly
altering her labour supply. ∆T/δ provides a discrete approximation to an agent’s marginal asset tax.19 It
follows that this too is linked to the presence wealth eﬀects on labour supply and, under the condition of
Lemma 9, is non-zero.
19If θ
∗is diﬀerentiable and B
∗







∂b ,w h e r e
∂θ∗
∂b is the wealth eﬀect term.
36T h ep r e s e n c eo fw e a l t he ﬀects on labor supply also implies that a tax system of the form T (b1,y 1)
that satisﬁes the state-by-state Euler equation cannot implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation. To
see this, deﬁne F(b1,y 1): ≡ βu(b1 + y − T(b1,y)). This function represents the discounted utility from
aﬀordable consumption at time 1 under the tax system. Assuming F is diﬀerentiable in b1, a tax function
T set so that the state-by-state Euler equation holds implies that ∂F/∂b1 is independent of y1,s ot h a tF
is additively separable in b1 and y1 and of the form: F(b1,y 1)=R(b1)+S(y1). Then, an agent choosing
labour in the market economy would maximise S(y)+θv(y), and the optimal choice of labour by the agent
would be independent of wealth. Thus, a tax function that satisﬁes the state-by-state Euler equations
cannot be used to implement a wealth-dependent labour allocation.
It is important to emphasise that this does not mean that the marginal asset tax will be non-stochastic
and independent of an agent’s labour. (60) will still imply that the marginal tax on assets will be diﬀerent
at low and high labor supplies at a given wealth level. Absent such a feature, the tax system would be
unable to rule out joint deviations analogous to those in our ﬁrst example, in which an agent with initial
wealth b0 saves more than B∗
1 (b0) and chooses y for some θ<θ ∗ (B∗
1(b0)). Instead in this example, and
in general, the government discourages saving by both reducing the after-tax expected return from saving
and increasing the covariance of that return with labour earnings. To analyse these eﬀects further, we
study numerical examples in section 7.
5.4 Utility bounds and borrowing limits
The previous examples focus on the implications of the incentive compatibility constraint for the tax
system. The lower bound on the continuation utilities in the component planning problems also has
implications both for taxes and the structure of asset markets. The argument in the proof of Proposition
1 implies that this lower bound can be implemented with a lower bound on an agent’s claim holdings.
In our implementation, an agent with utility promise wt and shock θ is induced to save Bt+1(ω∗
t(wt,θ)),
the corresponding continuation cost of a component planner. If the component planner is restricted to
making utility promises in excess of Ut+1, then our implementation will require agents to hold claims in
excess of bt+1 :≡ B1(Ut+1). This borrowing limit will bind on those agents with low after-tax resources,
xt = bt + yt − Tt(bt,y t),i np e r i o dt. When it binds, it also generates a wedge in the intertemporal Euler
equations of agents, though one that runs in the opposite direction to the wedge generated by the tax











where b ηt+1 denotes the multiplier on the borrowing limit. Consequently, the intertemporal wedge of an
agent can be decomposed as follows:



















The ﬁrst component is induced by the tax system, the second by the multiplier on the borrowing limit.
Clearly, the second component is only present when the borrowing limit binds. However, the lower utility
bound in the planner’s problem also has implications for the optimal tax system. Speciﬁcally, the bound
restricts the planner’s ability to use continuation utilities to provide incentives for truthful revelation in
the optimal mechanism. Thus, the planner must rely more heavily on variations in current consumption to
provide incentives. Close to the lower bound, the constrained eﬃcient allocation will then exhibit greater
consumption variability and larger insurance and eﬀort wedges. These characteristics translate into greater
curvature of the optimal tax function at wealth levels close to the borrowing limit.
6E x t e n s i o n : T h e ∞-period economy
For this subsection we set T = ∞. W ea s s u m et h a tU and V are compact sets. In this inﬁnite period
setting, this assumption guarantees that a utility allocation satisfying the temporary incentive-compatibility
constraints (6) also satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility condition (5). The deﬁnition of an equilibrium in
a component planning economy is almost identical to that given in Deﬁnition 1. We simply require that
P∞
t=0 qt < ∞ and that Conditions 1 and 2 in that deﬁnition are replaced by:
10 For all t, Bt and Bt+1 satisfy (11). Additionally, each Bt ≥− y(1 +
P∞
t=0 qt).20
20 For all t, {ϕ∗
t,ς∗
t,ω∗
t+1} attain the inﬁma in the problems (11).
20This boundedness in conjunction with an argument similar to Theorem 4.14 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) guar-
antees that the sequence of {Bt}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes the Bellman equation (11).
38Similarly, the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium in a market economy is the same as Deﬁnition 2
except for the requirement that
P∞
t=0 qt < ∞ and the replacement of Conditions 1 and 2 in that deﬁnition
with:
10 For all t, Vt and Vt+1 satisfy (19). Additionally, each Vt : Bt → Wt.
20 For all t, {b ct, b yt,b bt+1} attain the inﬁma in the problems (19).
The deﬁnition of implementation is identical to that in the ﬁnite period case. We now have the following
proposition.









be an equilibrium of a inﬁnite-period component planner economy ECP({Ut+1}∞
t=0,{Gt}
∞
t=0 ,Ψ0).T h e n ,
the associated constrained eﬃcient utility allocation can be implemented by a competitive equilibrium in
a market economy with taxes and borrowing limits.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
7 Numerical Analysis
To shed further light on the properties of the optimal tax system, we turn to numerical examples. We set
parameters according to recent calibrations of Bewley economies with endogenous labour supply. However,
our examples are intended to be illustrative rather than a fully calibrated quantitative exercise. For reasons
of space, we only report one example in detail below. However, we indicate those properties that are robust
across other examples that we have computed.
7.1 Calibration and numerical procedure








39Here, θ may be interpreted as a cost of eﬀort shock21. This preference speciﬁcation is common in macro-
economics.22






.F o r o u r b e n c h m a r k
case, we follow Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2003) in setting the preference parameters (1−κ)/κ
to 1.184, y to 1, σ to 1.461,γto 2.54 . Heathcoate, Storesletten and Violante choose this parameterisation so
that their model matches the empirical fraction of time devoted to labour and the wage-hours correlation
for the US. It implies a Frisch elasticity of labour supply of 0.3. In addition, we set β to 0.90.I n t h e
benchmark case, we assume that 1/θ is distributed uniformly on the interval [0.2,1.2].W e s e t U to
−3.48, which translates into a borrowing limit of −2.14. This value of U lies between the lifetime utility
that an agent would attain if she were at her “natural” borrowing limit23 in a Bewley economy without
taxes, which is clearly −∞, and the lifetime utility under autarky without taxes and markets, equal to
−2.74. Government consumption is constant over time and equal to 0.1 in each period, which amounts to
approximately 30% of period aggregate output.
We numerically solve for the steady state of a component planner economy.24 In the steady state,
the price of one period non-contingent claims is constant at q, the component planner’s cost function B
and optimal policy functions, {ϕ∗,ς∗,ω∗} are time invariant, and the cross sectional distribution of utility
promises, Ψ,i saﬁx e dp o i n to ft h eM a r k o vo p e r a t o ri m p l i e db yω∗. Our algorithm solves the recursive
component planner problem using numerical dynamic programming techniques at each intertemporal price.
We use the policy functions from this problem to obtain an approximation to the limiting distribution over
utility promises. We iterate on the intertemporal price until this distribution is consistent with resource
feasibility. The solutions to the component planner problems imply a time invariant tax function T(b,y)
on Graph Y∗,w h e r eY∗(b)={y : y = Y (ς∗(B−1(b),θ)), θ ∈ Θ}.
21Alternatively, θ can be interpreted as the reciprocal of a productivity shock. Then, y should be interpreted as the agent’s
output.
22These preferences retain the key property of additive separability in consumption and labour. They drop the inessential
property of multiplicative separability in the shock and the utility from labour. They are clearly not bounded. Below, we
assume that the tax functions we compute do not admit an inﬁnite sequence of deviations that raise the agents’ payoﬀ above
their constrained eﬃcient one.
23The natural debt limit is the maximal borrowing that an agent can service. Given the bound on the agent’s per period
output, this borrowing limit is ﬁnite, but it translates into a utility bound of −∞.
24We do not have a proof of the existence of a steady state in our environment. The numerical policy functions we compute
indicate that the Markov process for utility promises possesses an ergodic distribution. As in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) the






















Figure 1: The tax function, T (b,y).
7.2 Numerical Results
The optimal tax function T for the benchmark parameterisation is illustrated in Figure 1 on the set Graph
Y∗. A striking feature of the tax function is the high curvature in the neighbourhood of the borrowing
limit. In particular, the cross partial of the tax function is large in absolute value here, making marginal
income taxes sensitive to wealth and marginal wealth taxes sensitive to income. This conforms with the
discussion in section 5.4. Figure 1 reveals that T is negative for small values of b and y, thus agents with
low wealths and low incomes receive transfers.
Figure 2 shows
∂T(b,y)
∂y , the marginal labour income tax in our economy, as a function of y.E a c h
curve corresponds to a diﬀerent wealth level b. Marginal labour income taxes are decreasing in wealth.
They decrease particularly rapidly as wealth levels approach the borrowing limit. We have found this
to be a robust feature of optimal tax functions across the various alternative parameterisations that we
have computed. In contrast, we have found that the dependence of the marginal labour income tax on
labour income is sensitive to the choice of utility function and shock distribution. In the benchmark
parameterisation that we illustrate here, marginal labour income taxes have an inverted U shape when
drawn as a function of income, holding wealth ﬁxed. At the lowest and highest labour supplies at each
wealth level, the marginal income tax is zero. At intermediate levels it is positive.25
25T h es a m ep a t t e r nh a sb e e nf o u n di nt h es t a t i cn o n - l i n e a rt a xliterature when similar assumptions on preferences and









































Figure 2: The Marginal Labour Income Tax,
∂T(b,y)
∂y .
It is interesting to compare these ﬁndings to those from the static non-linear income taxation literature.
That literature has analysed the dependence of optimal marginal income taxes on income only. Given the
sensitivity of the optimal tax schedule to the speciﬁcation of preferences and the underlying shock distri-
bution, few general results are available. In his seminal contribution, Mirrlees (1971) obtained marginal
income tax rates that are low and slightly declining in income, while Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) ﬁnd
marginal income taxes that are high and sharply declining in income at low income levels.26 These recent
ﬁndings have been interpreted as being consistent with the empirical phasing out of social beneﬁts at low
incomes. Our result, that marginal income taxes should be high at low wealth levels, complements this.
It suggests that any transfers received by low wealth agents should be rapidly phased out as their income
rises.
The implications of the intertemporal wedge for marginal asset taxes are illustrated in ﬁgures 3 and 4.
Figure 3 plots ∂T
∂b(·,y) against b for diﬀerent ﬁxed labour income levels y.A st h eﬁgure indicates, marginal
asset taxes vary across incomes. Thus, an agent’s period t +1marginal asset tax is stochastic from the
shocks are made. The zero marginal income taxes at the lowest and highest labour supplies stem from the fact that the
incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind at these points. See Seade (1977).
26The low value of marginal income taxes in Mirrlees (1971) stems from his choice of utility function: logc+log(1−l),w h i c h
implies a high labour supply elasticity. The monotonically declining pattern of rates in income stems from his assumption of a
log-normal distribution of shocks. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) assume lower labour supply elasticities and a (calibrated)
Pareto shock distribution, and obtain higher marginal income taxes.
42perspective of period t. Moreover, these marginal assets taxes covary negatively with income, being high at
low income levels and low at high ones. As with marginal income taxes, variation in marginal asset taxes
is greatest close to the borrowing limit. Figure 4 explicitly relates the tax function to the intertemporal
wedge. Recall that the contribution of the tax function to the intertemporal wedge can be decomposed
into an expected marginal tax and a covariance component:
Et
£∂T
















Figure 4 shows the total contribution of the tax function to the wedge (solid line), as well as the expected
marginal asset tax (dashed line) and covariance (dash-dot) components. Since the covariance component
is always positive, the total contribution acts as an upper bound for the expected marginal asset tax.
The total contribution is small away from the asset limit. Over most of the wealth range it is less than
1% in value, but close to the borrowing limit it becomes much larger rising to about 16%. The expected
marginal asset tax peaks at a little over 2% at the borrowing limit, and then falls steadily with wealth.
The covariance component is also decreasing in wealth, but it is much larger close to the limit and falls
oﬀ much more quickly as wealth increases. Consequently, the covariance component plays the major role
in generating the total contribution of the tax system to the intertemporal wedge only when the agent’s
wealth is small and the total contribution is high. The small total contribution of the tax function to
the intertemporal wedge does not imply that taxation of asset income is small in our economy. The gross
return on assets in our benchmark parameterization is approximately equal to 10%.I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e
corresponding tax on asset income is equal to the tax contribution to the intertemporal wedge multiplied
by a factor of 10.27
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We study optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information. We show that
constrained eﬃcient allocations in this environment can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market
27The equilibrium value of q is 0.90375 for our benchmark parameterization. The corresponding marginal tax on asset












evaluated at the constrained eﬃcient allocation.





































Figure 3: The marginal asset tax,
∂T(b,y)
∂b .



































Figure 4: The tax contribution to the in-
tertemporal wedge.
economies with taxes. The optimal tax system is simple and conditions only upon current wealth and
current labour earnings. The incentive compatibility constraints shape the features of the resulting optimal
tax system. We analytically derive implications for both income and asset taxation and further explore
them in numerical examples.
We construct our optimal tax system using the recursive formulation of the planner’s problem. This
formulation relies on expected utility promises to summarise past histories of shocks. We obtain an agent’s
constrained eﬃcient continuation allocation as a function of her wealth in the market economy, rather than
her expected utility promise. In our ﬁscal implementation, we then set taxes as functions of an agent’s
wealth and labour supply so as to ensure that the agent can aﬀord the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
These tax functions allow the government to pin down an agent’s after-tax resources as a function of her
current wealth and current labour supply. We show that given future tax functions, the agent will ﬁnd it
optimal to allocate after-tax resources between consumption and savings in a socially eﬃcient way.
The recursive formulation of the planner’s problem that underlies this argument is, however, only
valid for the case in which the agent’s shocks are i.i.d. Consequently, our ﬁscal implementation will not
work when shocks are persistent. In this case, wealth levels do not adequately describe past histories.
Moreover, when shocks are persistent an agent’s current shock inﬂuences her intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution. Thus, the agent’s intertemporal allocation of consumption and savings will depend upon
44this shock as well as her after-tax quantity of resources. The simple decomposition of the agent’s and
component planner’s within period problem on which the proof of Proposition 1 relies will no longer holds.
Kocherlakota (2003) provides an alternative ﬁscal implementation that works even with persistent
shocks. In Kocherlakota’s formulation, the government keeps track of an agent’s entire history of labour
supplies and condition taxes upon this history. The government does not use wealth to summarise aspects
of an agent’s past history.
It remains an open question as to whether there exists a ﬁscal implementation intermediate between
ours and Kocherlakota’s that would be valid for an economy with persistent shocks. Doepke and Townsend
(2002) and Fernandes and Phelan (2000) have shown that there do exist recursive formulations of the
planning problem for Markovian shocks. These rely on a vector of utility promises to keep track of
histories. Similarly, a recursive ﬁscal implementation for an economy with persistent shocks could not rely
on an agent’s stock of non-contingent claims alone to keep track of past histories. It would be necessary to
augment the state space. For example, it may be possible to use an agent’s portfolio position in a richer
asset market structure in conjunction with truncated labour histories to encode past shock histories. We
leave this important extension to future work.
Our ﬁscal implementation also embeds speciﬁc assumptions about the relative roles of markets and gov-
ernment policy. In particular, no private insurance contracts are allowed with the current market structure.
In practice, government welfare programs and private credit and insurance contracts are complementary
in providing incentives and determining the extent of risk-sharing supported in a competitive equilibrium.
Exploring this complementarity could provide important insight in cross-country diﬀerences in government
policies.
9A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
Proof of Lemma 2: The constraints in problem (14) are linear and the objective is strictly convex.
Hence, by a standard argument (see for example, Stokey, Lucas with Prescott, 1989, Theorem 4.8) BT is
also strictly convex. Suppose Bt+1 is strictly convex. The constraints in problem (11) are linear and, since
Bt+1 is strictly convex so is the objective in problem (11). Thus, Bt is also strictly convex. Applying this
argument iteratively from period T − 1 back to period 0 completes the proof. ¥




t+1(wt,·)} that solve problem (11) when w ∈ Wt can be established by applying the
arguments of Kahn (1993). The existence of functions {ϕ∗
T(w,·),υ∗
T(w,·)} that solve problem (14) when
wt ∈ Wt+1 can be similarly established.
By a standard argument, if (ϕ0,ς0) satisﬁes the period T incentive-compatibility (15), then ϕ0 and ς0 are
monotone in θ. Hence, (ϕ∗
T(wT,·),ς∗
T(wT,·)) are monotone. Similarly, if (ϕ0,ς0,ω0) satisﬁes the incentive-
compatibility condition (12), then ς0 and d0 = ϕ0+βω0 are monotone. Hence, for t<T, (d∗
t(wt,·),ς∗
t(wt,·))
are monotone, where d∗
t(wt,·)=ϕ∗
t(wt,·)+βω∗








t(wt,θ))). The strict convexity of C
and Bt+1 imply that (ϕ0(d),ω0(d)) are strictly increasing. Since d∗
t is monotone, it then follows that ϕ∗
t
and ω∗















P r o o fo fL e m m a4P a r t1 .The two incentive constraints imply that ς(θ) ≥ ς(θ) and ϕ(θ) ≥ ς(θ).
Hence, the “upward” incentive constraint: ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) must hold with equality at the
optimum. If not ϕ(θ) >ϕ (θ), but then the strict convexity of C implies that the planner can reduce her
costs by lowering ϕ(θ) by ε and raising ϕ(θ) by επ(θ)/π(θ). The promise keeping and upward incentive
constraint can then be used to eliminate the ϕ variables from the planner’s problem. We drop the downward
incentive constraint ϕ(θ)+θς(θ) ≥ ϕ(θ)+θς(θ), and consider the following problem:
sup
{ς(θ),ς(θ)}
{C(w1 − (θ − θ)ς(θ)π(θ) − θς(θ)) − Y (ς(θ))}π(θ)+{C(w1 − E[θ]ς(θ)) − Y (ς(θ))}π(θ). (66)
It follows from (66), the convexity of C and −Y and the fact that C0(0) = 0, that there is a critical A such
that if A(w1) ≡ w1 − (θ − θ)ς∗
1(w1,θ)π(θ) >A ,t h e nς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y).I f A(w1) <A , ς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y).
Suppose that A(w1) >A ,t h e nC(A(w1) − θv(y)) −y <C (A(w1) − θv(y)) −y.A l s o , w1 = A(w1)+
(θ − θ)ς∗
1(w1,θ)π(θ) >A (w1). So, by the convexity of C, C(w1 − θv(y)) − y <C (w1 − θv(y)) − y. Again
by the strict convexity of C, C(w1−E[θ]v(y)) − y <C (w1−E[θ]v(y)) − y.T h u s ,i fA(w1) >A ,i tf o l l o w s
from (66) that the cost in state θ is lower if ς(θ)=v(y).T h ec o s ti ns t a t eθ is also lower if ς(θ)=v(y).
So in fact ς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y). It follows that there exists a critical w1 = A +( θ − θ)v(y)π(θ), such that for
46w1 > w1, ς∗
1(w1,θ) and ς∗
1(w1,θ) equal v(y),f o rw1 < w1, ς∗





{C(w1 − (θ − θ)ς(θ)π(θ) − θv(y))}π(θ)+{C(w1 − E[θ]ς(θ)) − Y (ς(θ))}π(θ).
It follows easily from the convexity of C and −Y that there exists a critical w1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, such that
for w1 >w 1, ς∗(w1,θ)=v(y),a n df o rw1 <w 1, ς∗
1(w1,θ)=v(y).( T h es e tw1 <w 1 may be empty). It
follows from the above discussion that the solution to (66) satisﬁes the upwards incentive constraint with
equality and ς∗
1(w1,·) is non-decreasing. Hence, this solution satisﬁes the downwards incentive constraint
and solves the original component planner’s problem.
Part 2. It follows from the previous part that
B1(w)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
B11(w1)=C(w1 − E[θ]v(y)) − y for w1 <w 1
B12(w1)={C(w1 − (θ − θ)v(y)π(θ) − θv(y)) − y}π(θ) for w1 ∈ (w1,w1)
+ {C(w1 − E[θ]v(y)) − y}π(θ)
B13(w1)=C(w1 − E[θ]v(y)) − y for w1 > w1.
Each B1i is strictly convex and diﬀerentiable. Hence, B1 is piecewise strictly convex and diﬀerentiable
except at w1 and w1.
Part 3. Let B0i(w0)=s u pC(w0−βw1)+qB1i(w1).L e tw∗
1i(w0) denote the solutions to these problems,
where C0(w0 − βw∗
1i(w0)) = q/βB0
1i(w∗
1i(w0)).C l e a r l y , B0
11 >B 0
12 >B 0




13(w0).T h u s ,B0
01(w0)=C0(w0 − βw∗
11(w0)) >C 0(w0 − βw∗
12(w0)) = B0
02(w0).A l s o ,w∗
11(w0) is strictly
increasing, and eventually, w∗





1(w0)) ≥ C(w0 − βw∗
2(w0)) + qB12(w∗
2(w0)). Thus, there exists a critical w12
0
such that for w0 >(resp. <)w12
0 , B02(w0) <B 01(w0). By identical reasoning, there exists a critical w23
0
such that for w0 >(resp. <)w23
0 , B03(w0) <B 02(w0) and a critical w13
0 such that for w0 >(resp. <)w13
0 ,
B03(w0) <B 01(w0).L e tw0 =m i n ( w12
0 ,w13
0 ) and w0 =m i n ( w23
0 ,w13
0 ). Then, for w<w 0, ω∗ = w∗
11,f o r
w ∈ (w0,w0), ω∗ = w∗
12,a n df o rw>w0, ω∗ = w∗
13.T h u s ,ω∗ is increasing. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :By (53), if the agent saves b∗
1, she attains the consumption level c∗
1(y) if she
chooses y and c∗





1(θ)). Thus, independently of the agent’s labour choice in period 1,i ti so p t i m a l
for the agent to save b∗
1. It then follows from the component planner’s incentive-compatibility condition
47that the agent will choose (c∗
1(θ),y) when her shock equals θ and (c∗
1(θ),y) otherwise. Hence, a∗ can be
implemented in a market economy with the tax function (54).
Now, suppose that the tax function T(b,y)=T0(y)+T1(y)b implements a∗ in the market economy
and that T1(y) <T 1. Then, as in the proof of the previous lemma, the agent can save b∗
1 and select y
regardless of her shock. This is feasible and delivers the same payoﬀ, w0, to the agent as a∗. However, since
T1(y) <T1, qu0(c∗
0) <β (1−T1(y))u0(c∗
1(θ)),s ot h a tt h ea g e n tc a nd oe v e nb e t t e ra n do b t a i nap a y o ﬀ above
w0 by saving slightly more than b∗
1, and selecting an eﬀort of y r e g a r d l e s so fh e rs h o c k .I tf o l l o w st h a ti f
T(b,y) implements a∗ then T1(y) ≥ T1. Similarly, if T1(y) >T 1, the agent can improve on the planner’s
solution by saving slightly less than b∗
1 and choosing y regardless of her shock. Thus, T1(y)=T1.I tt h e n
follows from (48), that the agent’s a∗ is consistent with the agent’s Euler equation only if T1(y)=T1. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a9 :Deﬁne K(b θ)=v
R b θ
θ (b θ − θ)π(θ)dθ − v
R θ
b θ (θ −b θ)π(θ)dθ. The promise keeping and




(w0 − ϕ0)+K(b θ) −b θv and ϕ1 =
1
β









1(ω∗(w0)). Suppose that w2
0 >w 1
0 and






0).T h eﬁrst order conditions for the component planner’s problem yield at each
wi







1)(1 − Π(e θ))]. (68)


















1) − Y (v)} − {C(ϕ◦
1) − Y (v)}
i
ρ(e θ)+[ C0(ϕ◦
1)∆v(1 − Π(e θ)) − C0(ϕ◦
1)∆vΠ(e θ)] = 0. (69)
The ﬁrst term above is negative: the component planner obtains a higher quantity of net resources when
the agent exerts higher eﬀort. Consequently, the second term is positive. Now incentive-compatibility
implies: ϕ◦(wi
0)−ϕ◦(wi









0)), so that the ﬁrst term in the above expression increases across
the two utility promise levels w1
0 and w2
0. Next let H(ϕ)=[ C0(ϕ + e θ∆v)∆v(1 − Π(e θ)) − C0(ϕ)∆vΠ(e θ)].
48Then













[C0(ϕ +e θ∆v)∆v(1 − Π(e θ)) − C0(ϕ)∆vΠ(e θ)] > 0.
Here, the ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption in the lemma and the second from the fact that










0) H0(ϕ)dϕ > 0.T h i s ,
however, implies that the second term on the left hand side of (69) is increasing. But then both terms on
the left hand side of (69) are higher at w2
0 than w1
0. This contradicts (69) holding at both w2
0 than w1
0.
If b1 and b0
1 are in B∗
1, then there exists a w0 and a w0
0 such that b1 = B1(ω∗(w0)) and b0
1 = B1(ω∗(w0
0)).






P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Truncate the inﬁnite-period market economy at T<∞. Set the agent’s
period T +1value function in the truncated economy to b VT+1 = B−1
T+1. Subdivide each period t ∈
{0,...,T} into two sub-periods. In the ﬁrst the agent exerts eﬀort yt and obtains some after-tax resources
xt = bt + yt − Tt(bt,y t). In the second, the agent allocates xt between consumption ct and savings bt+1.
Each period of the component planner’s problem can be similarly sub-divided. In the ﬁrst sub-period,
the agent makes a report and the component planner allocates utility from eﬀort and an interim utility
promise; in the second, the planner allocates the interim utility promise between utility from consumption
and a continuation utility promise. By repeated application of the argument in the proof of Proposition
1, beginning in period T, a sequence of tax functions {Tt}T
t=0 and borrowing limits {bt+1}T−1
t=0 can be
constructed such that confronted with these sequences, it is optimal for an agent with initial wealth B0(w0)
t oc h o o s et h es a m ep e r i o dT-truncated allocation, {ct,y t}T
t=0 as is awarded to an agent with a w0-utility
promise by the component planner.
By successively increasing T, a sequence of tax functions {Tt}∞
t=0 and borrowing limits {bt+1}∞
t=0 can
be constructed which, along with {Gt}∞
t=0 and Λ0 deﬁne a market economy. Set f = B0. If an agent with
an initial quantity of claims B0(w0) selects z∗(w0), the allocation obtained by a w0-promise agent in the
component economy, then she too receives a payoﬀ of w0. Suppose there is some alternative allocation
available to the agent in the constructed market economy that gives a payoﬀ of e U∞ >w 0 + ε>w 0.
Let e UT denote the payoﬀ earned from this allocation over the initial T periods, and let e bT+1 denote the
49agent’s savings at date T under this allocation. Similarly, let UT be the agent’s payoﬀ from z∗(w0) over
the initial T periods and let bT+1 be the agent’s savings at date T under this allocation. Now since agents
choose to select the component planner allocation in the truncated economy: UT(w0)+βTEb VT+1(bT+1) ≥
e UT + βTEb VT+1(e bT+1) Hence, since the agent’s utility functions are bounded, w0 =l i m T→∞[UT(w0)+
βTEb VT+1(bT+1)] ≥ limT→∞[e UT +βTEb VT+1(e bT+1)] = e U∞ >w 0 + ε. This is a contradiction. It then follows
that in the untruncated economy, the agent with initial wealth B0(w0) selects the allocation obtained by
an agent with an initial utility promise of w0. Condition 2 in the implementation deﬁnition is satisﬁed. ¥
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53Period 1 Period 0
PERIOD 0: Stage 1
Solve:
V 0(b0)=maxx,y0 D(x)+θ 0v(y0)
s.t.  b0=x+T0(b0,y0)-y0
PERIOD 0: Stage 2
Solve:





V 1(b1)=maxc 1,y1 u(c1)+θ 1v(y1)
s.t.  b1=c1+T1(b1,y1)-y1
Figure A1: Timeline for the market economy.
Period 1 Period 0
PERIOD 0: Stage 1
Solve:
B 0(w0)=mind,ς 0 E[X(d)+Y(ς0)]
s.t.  w0=E[d +θ 0ς0 ]
+    Incentive compatibility
PERIOD 0: Stage 2
Solve:
X(d)=minφ 0,w 1C(φ 0)+qB1(w1)




B 1(w1)=minφ 1,ς 1E[C(φ 1)+Y(ς1)]
s.t.  w1=E[φ 1 +θ 1ς1 ]
+    Incentive compatibility
Figure A2: Timeline for the component planner economy.
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